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ABSTRACT
We aim to quantify the role of social networks in job-related migration. With over 130 million rural
labors migrating to the city each year, China is experiencing the largest internal migration in the human
history. Using instrumental variables in the 2006 China Agricultural Census, we find that a 10-percentage-point
increase in the migration rate of co-villagers raises one's migration probability by 7.27 percent points,
an effect comparable to an increase of education by 7-8 years. Evidence suggests that most of this
effect is driven by co-villagers helping each other in moving cost and job search at the destination.
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1. Introduction 
In the past 20 years, China has witnessed an explosive growth of labor migration. Cai (1996) 
estimates that 34.1 million workers had left their rural home for urban jobs in 1990. This number 
increased to 67 million in 1999 (Huang and Pieke 2003), 131.81 million in 2006, and 140.41 million in 
2008.
1  According to Young (2003), a rising labor participation rate, most of which is attributable to the 
transfer of labor out of agriculture, accounts for nearly one-ninth of the 7.8% annual GDP growth of 
China.
2 However, due to residence permit and other institutional barriers in China, most migrating 
workers do not migrate permanently to the city (Zhao 1999a & 1999b). They leave families at home and 
travel between rural home and urban job every year.  This leads to a number of social issues including 
traffic congestion, lack of labor protection, child development problems, elderly care, and a link of macro 
risks between origin and destination.
3 To better understand these implications, it is important to examine 
not only what factors drive migration but also the relative importance of these factors.      
Using China as an example, this paper aims to quantify the role of social networks in job-related 
migration. Classical theories argue that an individual will migrate if the discounted present value of 
income gains exceeds the cost of migration (Sjaastad 1962 and Becker 1975). These models emphasize 
geographic attributes (e.g. distance to destination), individual characteristics (e.g. age and education) and 
market factors (e.g. wage gap and land ownership).
4 A more recent literature explores the role of social 
interactions in migration. In theory, social networks could generate a snowball effect in the dynamic 
pattern of migration (Carrington et al. 1996),  but empirical evidence on the causal effects of social 
network is difficult to establish, partly because of data limit, partly because people in the same social 
network may influence each other thus subject to a well known “reflection” problem (Manski 1993).  
Migrants, when asked directly, often cite social network as one of the major reasons for labor 
migration. Conversely, potential migrants often cite lack of social networks as a hurdle of migration.
5 
Either way, the survey evidence is qualitative and does not precisely measure the effects of social 
networks. In complement, several papers have attempted to identify the role of social networks from 
                                                 
1 The latter two numbers are based on National Bureau of Statistics reports accessed at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/nypcgb/qgnypcgb/t20080227_402464718.htm and 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20090325_402547406.htm on September 1, 2010. In these reports, migrating 
workers are defined as rural labors that have migrated for jobs out of the residential township for at least one months 
during the calendar year.  
2 Young (2003) calculates the annual 7.8% GDP growth based on published data from 1978 to 1998. He shows that 
the deflated annual growth is 6.1%, of which 0.9% can be attributable to the increase of labor participation. 0.9% is 
approximately one-nine of 7.8%.   
3For example, the Chinese railway system has accommodated 192 million passenger-trips during the 40-day rush of 
2009. A significant part of the traffic is driven by rural migrants going home before the Spring Festival and 
returning to urban work after the festival ( http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-
02/19/content_10849579.htm). 
4 See surveys of migration in Rosenzweig (1988), Borjas (1994) and Lucas (1997). 
5 See evidence in Hare and Zhao (2000), Mallee (2000), Meng (2000), Chen (2005), and Du, Park and Wang (2005).   3 
observational data (Munshi 2003, Mckenzie and Rapoport 2007, Woodruff and Zenteno 2007, Chen et al. 
2008). To separate social networks from confounding factors, they use historical rainfall or historical 
migration rate of the sending community as an instrument (IV) for previous migrants. Strictly speaking, 
these community-level IVs could affect both previous and current migrants in the same social network, 
hence does not solve the identification problem.   
Individual-level data plus the institutional context of China allow us to better identify the effects 
of social networks on whether and where to migrate.  Based on 5.9 million individual observations from 
the 2006 China Agriculture Census, we presumably observe every one that has a residential permit 
(hukou) in a continuous rural area, including those who have migrated for remote jobs.  Because many 
agricultural, governmental and social activities are organized by village, Chinese village is a natural unit 
of social network. We refer to people residing in the same village as co-villagers, neighbors or peers.
6  
When a villager migrates to the city and comes back for holiday or family visit, the information 
he has about the destination spreads out fast to the co-villagers. Since many Chinese cities impose barrier 
to entry for rural migrants, having an acquaintance at the destination implies a substantial reduction of 
moving cost. These arguments suggest that migrants should cluster by village. Consistently, we observe 
migration rate varies greatly across nearby villages but migrants from the same village tend to cluster at 
the same destination for the same industrial sector. The degree of clustering is much more significant 
within a village than across villages in the same county or in the same township.  
Of course, a cluster of economic actions does not necessarily imply one’s action affects the action 
of other people in the same network. Clustered migration may be driven by villagers having similar 
individual characteristics or facing similar institutional environments. Even if we rule out these correlated 
effects, the migration decision of one villager may add peer pressure on non-migrants or create general 
equilibrium effects within the village (e.g. land redistribution), both of which could influence the 
migration of co-villagers. How to distinguish these alternative explanations from the role of social 
networks in information and cost sharing is the main challenge of our empirical analysis.  
We construct individual-level IVs that arguably affect individual A’s migration decision but not 
that of B directly except for the social interactions between A and B.  Specifically, in order to 
accommodate boy preference in rural areas, the central government of China issued “Document 7” on 
April 13, 1984, allowing rural households to have a second baby if the first child is a girl. Not only does 
this policy minimize sex selection on the firstborns
7, it also implies that rural households with a girl 
firstborn are more likely to have a second child and less likely to have any boy. Because of this effect on 
                                                 
6 Later, we also expand the “peer” definition to people in the same township or narrow “peers” to villagers with 
same age, gender, education or surname.  
7 Sex selection may take several forms ranging from selective abortion, abandon of newborns, to infanticide.   4 
family size and children’s gender composition, having a girl firstborn tends to encourage adult males 
(fathers, grandfathers, uncles) to migrate but hinder adult females (mothers, grandmothers, aunties) from 
migration.  Based on these empirical patterns, we construct IVs for neighbors’ migration decision using 
the gender of neighbors’ firstborn and the number of male and female labors in neighboring households. 
The key assumption is that one household’s fertility outcome and family structure do not directly affect 
the migration decision of its neighbors. To validate this assumption, we consider a number of scenarios 
that may violate this assumption and perform robustness check accordingly.   
Our IV results suggest that 10 percentage point increase in the percent of neighbors migrating out 
of a village will increase one’s own migration probability by 7.27 percentage points.  This effect is 
comparable to an increase of education by 7-8 years.
8 The importance of peer migration is also reflected 
in dynamics. If we ignore other long run considerations (e.g. aging), simulation shows that a village 
starting with a 1% of migration in the first year will reach a migration rate of 6% by the fifth year and 
over 60% by the eleventh year.  
Social interactions may arise because co-villagers use social network to reduce moving cost and 
obtain job information at the destination, or because of peer pressure and general equilibrium effects at 
the origin.  These two explanations can be separated because only the former implies that (1) migrants 
from the same village cluster at the same destination for the same type of jobs, and (2) the strength of the 
social interactions is greater for the origins that are more deprived of job information. We find evidence 
on both predictions: there is a strong within-village cluster by destination and industrial sector, and the 
impact of peer migration is greater in origins that are further away from the provincial capital. After 
ruling out organized migration as the third explanation, we conclude that social network is the dominant 
force driving migration clusters.  At the end of the paper, we argue that clustered migration could have 
profound implications on a number of socio-economic issues in China.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 
3 describes the background and data. Section 4 lays out a basic specification and reports the IV results. 
Section 5 separates the social network effects in cost and information sharing from other explanations. 
Section 6 simulates the snowball effect of peer migration and discusses the implications that clustered 
migration may have on rural and urban development. A brief conclusion is offered in Section 7.  
 
2. Literature Review  
The existing literature has stressed the importance of social networks in both migration and job 
search, but empirical evidence lags behind theory. In job search, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) 
show that job information sharing within a social network can explain why employment rate varies across 
                                                 
8 The average education of adult labor in our data is 7 years.   5 
networks, why unemployment rate persists in some networks, and why inequality across networks can be 
long lasting. Their model implies that a public policy that provides incentives to reduce initial labor 
market dropout could have a positive and persistent effect on future employment.
9 In a similar spirit, 
Carrington et al. (1996) establish a dynamic model of labor migration in which earlier migrants help later 
migrants to reduce moving costs at the same destination.  In their model, migration occurs gradually but 
develops momentum over time. It explains why migration tends to cluster by geography and why 
migratory flows may increase even as wage differentials narrow.  
In comparison, numerous facts of migration are consistent with the social network theory, but 
causal links are difficult to establish.  For example, many surveys find that having friends or relatives at 
the destination is positively correlated with one’s migration decision (Caces et al. 1985, Taylor 1986, 
Zhao 2003). On life after migration, US immigrants are shown to be more geographically concentrated 
than natives of the same age and ethnicity and often employed together (Bartel 1989, LaLonde and Topel 
1991). All these findings suggest that peer migrants may help improve job information and reduce 
moving costs. But they are also consistent with the alternative explanation that kins, friends, and co-
villagers share common preferences and therefore make similar migration decisions.  
   Researchers have used three ways to identify social network effects from confounding factors: 
one is controlling for a large number of group fixed effects (say census block group as in Bayer et al. 
2008) and then exploring employment cluster by a smaller unit (say census block) within the controlled 
group. The underlying assumption is that there is no unit-level correlation in unobserved individual 
attributes after taking into account the broader group.
10 This method alone is unlikely to succeed here, as 
co-villagers may have similar unobserved attributes and these attributes are likely to differ across villages.  
The second approach hinges on random assignment of neighbors. For example, the Moving to 
Opportunity (MTO) program provides housing vouchers to a randomly selected group of poor families in 
five US cities. Instead of examining whether an exogenous change of neighborhood affects individual 
behavior and economic outcomes (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007), we focus on closely-knit, long-
established networks (village) and examines how an exogenous shock to some members of a network 
affect the behavior of others in the same network. 
 We follow the third identification approach of instrumental variables (IV). We argue below that, 
under careful sampling, one’s firstborn outcome and family structure are related to one’s own migration 
decision but do not affect neighbors directly. Similar identification strategy has been pursued in settings 
other than migration and social network effects (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, Angrist and Evans 1998, 
                                                 
9 See Ioannides and Loury (2004) for a detailed review on the effects of social networks in job search. 
10 Similar identification strategy has been used in Aizer and Currie (2004) and Bertrand et al. (2000).    6 
Maurin and Moschion 2009, and Qian 2009).
11  Within the migration literature, our IVs are more suitable 
for identifying the social network effects than several community-level IVs used before. For example, 
Munshi (2003) uses rainfall in the origin as an IV for the prevalence of Mexico migrants from that origin 
in the US, and finds that the more established migrants there are, the better the employment status is for a 
new migrant from the same village. As Munshi (2003) acknowledges, lagged rainfall may affect current 
employment outcomes at the origin hence the current migration decision. This is why he focuses on the 
network effect on employment conditional on a person has migrated to the US, not the migration decision 
itself.  Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007) use historic migration rate as an IV for the stock of migration in the 
sending village and study how migration prevalence affects an individual’s current migration decision and 
the income inequality within the village. To the extent that historic migration rate (like historical rainfall) 
affects everyone at the origin, it is difficult to distinguish it from other unobserved village attribute. In 
comparison, our IVs vary across both villages and individuals. After using IVs, we are similar to Bayer et 
al. (2008) in that we examine whether the destination and industrial sector of migrants indicate any social 
network effects by controlling for the fixed effects of a larger area (county or township).  
Chen et al. (2008) use a smaller dataset and a different IV to address the same research question 
as in this paper. Denoting the individual under study as A, their IV is the political identity of A’s father in 
the Mao era. While this variable is likely correlated with A’s social ties within the same village (hence 
A’s migration decision if social ties matter), it is unclear why it is correlated with the neighbors’ 
migration tendency and why it should be excluded from the main regression. Since Chen et al. (2008) do 
not report the IV coefficients, we cannot compare our IV results with theirs. But our OLS results are 
similar to theirs, suggesting that the findings reported in our study is not specific to our sample area.  
  
3. Background and Data 
Labor market Appendix A describes the trend of rural-to-urban migration and the restrictions 
that migrants face under the hukou system. Despite the large flow of migrants, rural and urban workers 
are not close substitutes (Zhao 2005 and Cai, Park and Zhao forthcoming). Most rural-to-urban migrants 
are unskilled, do not have families in the city, and concentrate in dangerous, dirty or low-pay jobs. 
The labor market for rural-to-urban migrants is also plagued by the lack of information. After 
surveying 439 rural migrants in the city of Chang Sha in Spring 2004, Chen (2005) finds that most 
                                                 
11 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) use twins as an exogenous shock to study of the quantity-
quality tradeoff in family fertility; Angrist and Evans (1998) use the sex composition of the two eldest 
siblings as an instrument to identify the effect of family size on mother’s labor market participation; and 
Maurin and Moschion (2009) studies a French mother’s labor market participation in association with neighbors’ 
participation, using the sex composition of neighbor’s eldest siblings as the IV. In a recent study that evaluates 
the effect of family size on school enrollment, Qian (2009) instruments family size by the interaction of 
an individual’s sex, date of birth and region of birth.    7 
migrants found the job via informal channels: 57.2% relied on the introduction of relatives, friends, or 
migrants from the same origin; 13.2% contacted potential employers directly; 6.1% responded to 
employer recruitment (excluding mass media ads); 1.9% were self-employed; and only 1.4% found a job 
via advertisements on TV, newspapers or billboards. The fraction of government-organized migration is 
even smaller (0.5%). When asked how easy it is to find a job in the city, 44.5% answered difficult or very 
difficult. For the biggest hurdle of job search, 38.3% mentioned the lack of a social network and 25.1% 
mentioned the lack of job information. Instead of surveying people that have migrated to the city, Du, 
Park and Wang (2005) asked 582 rural households in four western counties to list the most important 
factors that affected their migration decision in 2000. The lack of information and social networks is the 
third most mentioned factor determining men’s migration, lagging behind agricultural labor demand and 
low education.
12 As an indirect evidence for the help of social networks, Bao et al. (2007) find that inter-
province migration rate increases with the size of the same-origin migrant network in the destination.  
Local governments play a limited role in matching rural migrants and urban employers. For 
example, most government organized job markets are held in a conference center within the city. Rural 
migrants must go to the city first before attending these job markets. At the other end, origin governments 
could contact far-away employers and organize rural residents to migrate conditional on job offers. But 
according to the 2003 rural survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, only 3.3% of the 113.9 
million rural migrants were employed via government-organized migration (Jian 2005). The rest relied on 
friends and relatives (41.3%) or self search (55.4%).   These numbers suggests that social networks and 
other informal channels play a dominant role in determining whether, when and where to migrate.  
Probably because of the information problem (and lack of labor protection for migrants), 2004 
witnessed a significant shortage of migrating labor.  According to the estimates from the Department of 
Labor in September 2004, roughly 10% of positions were left unfilled in the Pearl River triangle area and 
the labor shortage was concentrated in low-pay, skillful, and labor-intensive jobs such as toy and 
electronic assembly. This event suggests that many employers in coastal provinces did not foresee the 
short supply of migrant labor. In response, the central government issued a new policy in 2006 aiming to 
improve job information and training opportunities for migrating labor. In Section 5, we will discuss 
whether government-organized migration is a valid explanation for the observed migration patterns. 
                                                 
12 The four most important factors for men are (1) agricultural labor demand (25.9 percent), lack of education or 
skills (25.3 percent), lack of information and social networks (18.3 percent), and inability to finance transportation 
and search costs (14.1 percent).. The three most important factors for women are (1) unwillingness to be separated 
from children (46.2 percent), agricultural labor demand (21.0 percent), and lack of education or skills (12.7 percent). 
  
   8 
Fertility policy Since 1984, the central government allows rural households to have a second 
child if the firstborn is a girl, but leaves policy implementation to local governments. Appendix B 
describes the implementation guidance in our data province.  The second-child policy has several 
implications. First, there should be little gender selection in the firstborns if every family with a girl 
firstborn is allowed to have more children.
13 Second, conditional on a girl firstborn, households with a 
strong boy preference will increase family size and try to get a boy in the second birth. Both implications 
are confirmed in Ebenstein (2009). He shows that the sex of firstborn is balanced (51% being boy) and 
has changed little between 1982 and 2000, hence the imbalance between male and female as observed in 
Sen (1990) is mostly driven by gender selection for the second and later-borns.  As detailed in Section 4, 
the gender-specific fertility policy generate exogenous variations in family size and gender composition 
of children, which are important factors to be considered in one’s migration decision but not that of 
neighbors. This allows us to use the outcome of neighbors’ firstborn to construct IV for neighbors’ 
migration. As documented in Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2005), China’s one-child policy is only applicable to 
the Hans, which represent 92% of the Chinese population.  We do not know whether an individual is a 
minority or not but we do know whether a village is a gathering place for minorities. Later on we report 
robustness checks excluding minority villages. 
Data Description The National Bureau of Statistics of China has organized local governments to 
conduct two rounds of the China Agricultural Census (CAC) in 1996 and 2006 respectively. The CAC is 
designed to cover every individual that resided or had registered residence in every village at the time of 
interview.  The exhaustive nature of CAC allows us to have a clear boundary of social networks by 
village. It also allows us to test if a boarder definition of social network yields different results.  
Drawn from the 2006 CAC, our data cover all the rural residents in a poor area of China as of 
December 31, 2006.  In collaboration with the local government, we are not allowed to reveal the 
geographic location, but the studied area belongs to an inland province whose per capita income is 
significantly lower than the national average. In total, we observe 5.9 million individuals in 1.4 million 
households and 3,986 villages. These villages belong to 250 townships and spread across 8 counties. The 
size of the whole census area is roughly 16,000 km
2 total, with on average area of 4 km
2 per village. 
Compared to other migration data that often contain a limited sample of households from a small number 
of communities
14, we can define who and who are in the same network, the demographics of network 
                                                 
13 In theory, the policy may even encourage sex selection towards girl in the firstborn, but such selection is unlikely 
to happen in our study area given (1) the strong boy preference and (2) the large faction having a second child after a 
boy firstborn (despite fines). 
14 For example, the Mexican Migration Project used in both Munshi (2003) and Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007) 
surveys 57 rural communities and 200 households per community. The data used in Chen et al. (2008) – the 2002   9 
members, and the migration decision of each member. The exhaustive nature of the data allows us to 
measure the migration rate of neighbors more precisely. 
The main part of the data was collected at the household level. The household head was asked to 
enter information for every family member. If a resident was away from home at the time of interview, 
his/her information was still collected from the household.
15 By this design, we observe detailed 
household information including how many individuals reside in the household, their relationship to the 
household head, their age and gender composition, the amount of contract land, the amount of land in use, 
ownership of housing, the self-estimated value of house(s), ownership of durable goods, the availability 
of electricity, water and other amenities, the number of household members that receive government 
subsidies, and engagement in various agricultural activities. Individual level data are limited to age, sex, 
education, employment, industrial sector, and the number of months away from home for out-of-township 
employment in 2006. Since a child in the studied area may get married as early as 17 and daughters often 
leave their own home after marriage, we restrict the child definition to age 0-16.  
One data complication is that, although for over 99% of households we can infer spouse- or 
parent-child relationship via his/her reported relationship to the household head, we may not observe all 
the adult children (age at or above 17) because some of them may have married away and established 
their own households.  This is a common problem in household surveys (see for example Angrist and 
Evans 1998). In our data, 9.99% of the households report three or more generations, 82.03% report two 
generations, and 7.98% report one generation. Out of the 1.19 million households that have at least two 
generations, 0.856 million (or 71.69%) report children under age 16. To minimize the potential missing 
problem of adult children, our IV construction focuses on the 0.661 million households that report the 
oldest child (living in the households) at or under age 16. For the other households, we code each adult’s 
own fertility information as missing.
16  
We argue that the missing-adult-children problem does not prevent us from calculating the 
average percentage of multiple birth or the average gender of firstborns at the village level, as long as the 
real values of these variables are uncorrelated with whether a household reports a child over age 16 or 
not. This is a reasonable assumption because the missing values are mostly driven by the age and cohort 
of the adults under study. To justify this assumption, we will present results including only the 
households that have household head’s age at or under 35. We also report results including only two-adult 
                                                                                                                                                       
Chinese Household Income Project Survey -- covers more counties than our data (121) but their sample consists of 
9200 households in 961 villages. This implies that on average they observe no more than 10 households per village.   
15 If a whole household has migrated but still holds hukou in the village, the village head will fill the form for the 
household.  
16 To be precise, out of the 576352 adult labors for which we code the gender of firstborn as missing, 576101 (or 
99.96%) is because they report a child over age 16 and therefore we cannot determine with the reported oldest child 
is the real oldest child.    10 
families, to address the less than 1% possibility that a household structure may be too complicated for us 
to infer who is whose child. Another implication from the lack of full fertility history is that our village-
average calculation for both peer migration rate and its instruments may introduce large measurement 
errors if the village is small. We drop 36 (<1%) villages that have less than 100 adults of age 17-60.   
Supplemental data were collected at the village level including the size of the village in both 
arable land and registered population, whether the village is a place for minority gathering, the distance to 
the nearest bus station
17, access to water, electricity and other amenities, and whether the village has a 
national poverty status (as designated by the Central government).
18 The data also include several 
township level variables, including the number and nature of township-village-enterprises, the distance 
between the township and county center, whether there is a highway exit within the boundary of the 
township, and registered population of the township.    
Above all, the 2006 CAC data is especially suitable for studying social network effects in 
migration because we observe one’s own migration as well as the migration decision of almost all the 
other adults in the same village. One shortcoming is that we only observe the migration decision at the 
time of data collection and cannot identify who have migrated long before 2006 and who just started to 
migrate in 2006. For this reason, the social network effects identified in this study only reflect a cluster of 
self and peer migration, which could be driven by a group of adults migrating together or some migrants 
migrating early and then helping others to migrate afterwards. Similarly, we only observe where a 
migrant migrates to as of December 31, 2006; we don’t know whether s/he has moved directly to the 
destination, or stepwise from the village to an intermediary location first and then from to the destination.  
Sample Construction We focus on adults between age 17 and 60. Individuals that have non-rural 
Hukou and in-school students are dropped from the sample. Dropping 36 villages that have less than 100 
adults, our final sample consists of 3.3 million adults in 3950 villages. These villages belong to eight 
counties, which allow us to examine village-by-village differences within each county. In theory, we can 
also impose township fixed effects and focus on village variations within the same township. However, 
since on average we have only 15 villages per township and these villages are geographically adjacent to 
each other, township fixed effects will absorb a large amount of heterogeneity across villages. This could 
be unnecessary given our IV strategy. In light of this, we control for township variables in the main 
specification (with county fixed effects) but apply township fixed effects for a robustness check.  
The CAC questionnaire asks explicitly how many months a respondent has been away from the 
residential village for out-of-township employment during 2006. One month away from home is defined 
                                                 
17 The exact question is to the nearest bus/rail/dock station, but there is no railway station or major river in the 
studied area.  
18 Due to potential measurement errors in the registered population, we calculate the number of adults per village 
from our study sample and use it to proxy village population.   11 
as being away for more than 15 days in that month.  Based on this question, we define an adult as a 
“migrant” if s/he has been away for at least one month in 2006. This definition yields 17.08% of adults in 
our sample being migrants in 2006. As shown in Appendix Figure A2, the majority of migrants report that 
they stay away from home for at least 10 months a year. This suggests that most migrants live and work 
in a far-away place and only come back home for short visits. An alternative definition of migration as 
six-or-more months away from home renders very similar results. Each migrant is also required to report 
the migration destination and industrial sector. Destination is reported by whether the migrant works in or 
out of the studied area if it is within the same province, and by province if it is out of the studied province.  
Industrial sector is reported in the category of manufacturing, construction, services, or other.  
Data Summary Table 1 reports summary statistics for major migration destinations. In addition 
to the percent of migrants going to each destination, we report the number of bus/railway hours needed to 
transport to each destination from the center of the studied area
19, as well as the relative income across 
destinations. Scaling the 2006 per (rural) capita income of the studied area  to one, Table 1 shows that 
almost all the destinations have significantly higher per capita income than the studied area; some are 
even eight or ten times higher.
20  Consistent with the literature, the most attractive destinations are either 
high-income or within a short distance. However, income gap and distance do not explain everything. For 
example, destination F has the highest income per capita in the list. The next highest-income destination 
(A) is almost the same distance from the sampled area as F, but the percent of migrants to A (27.86%) is 
much higher than to F (1.92%). Apparently other forces are at work when people decide where to migrate. 
Appendix Table A1 reports summary statistics for the individual, household, village, and 
township-level variables by migration status. Consistent with the literature, migrants are on average 10 
years younger, have one more year of schooling, and are more likely to be male and the head of 
household. Figure 1 reports the percent of migration by age and gender. It is clear that young adults aged 
20-25 are most likely to migrate. Migration tendency declines sharply after age 30. The percent of 
migration is similar for men and women before age 22, but men are significantly more likely to migrate 
after 22, probably because married women stay home for childbearing, child care and elderly care.  
It is worth noting that both migrants and non-migrants have a similar percent of girl firstborn 
(both 49%) on average, which raises a concern that the gender of girl firstborn may not have enough 
statistical power to be a good IV. As shown later, this impression is incorrect because a girl firstborn have 
opposite effects on adult males and females: female labors are less likely to migrate conditional on having 
                                                 
19 Since there is no railway station in the studied area, we first compute the bus hours from the area center to the 
province capital and add that to the number of railway hours from the province capital to other provinces.  
20 The comparison is based on China National Statistical Book, so the income difference may reflect differences in 
observable attributes. For example, a rural migrant to A may not expect to earn the average income in A because he 
is less educated and does not have full access to all the job opportunities of his education level due to hukou 
requirement in some city jobs. In this sense, Table 1 is only suggestive.   12 
a girl firstborn while male labors are more likely to migrate. As Table A2 does not distinguish male and 
female labors, it is not surprising to see a similar percent of girl firstborn in migrants and non-migrants.   
In terms of family structure, Table A2 shows that migrants are more likely to come from a 
household that has fewer children under age 16. Interestingly, the probability of having any boy is 41% 
for migrating households, which is much lower than that of non-migrants (51%). This difference suggests 
that migration may be related to the boy preference, as parents that prefer boys may want to give better 
child care to boys, or parents with boys may feel less necessary to work and save for themselves because 
their sons will provide elderly care in the future. Table 4 explores these channels in more details.  
As expected, both capital ownership and ease to transport differ between migrants and non-
migrants. Migrants are more likely to have a lower house value and some outstanding loans, but their 
contracted land (at the household level) is no less than that of non-migrants. The latter is masked by the 
difference in the number of adults within a household. At the village level, migrants do have less land per 
adult.  As we would expect, migrants have less land in use than non-migrants because they spend the 
most time away from home. In terms of transportation, migrants are 13% closer
21 to the nearest bus 
station, and they are more likely to live in a village with more access to drivable road.  
Migration clusters All the social network theories predict heterogeneity across networks, Figure 
2 shows that migration rate per village ranges widely from 0% to 50%. For the same reason, Panel D of 
Table A2 reports by one’s migration status the percent of co-villagers that migrate in 2006 excluding 
adults in own household. Clearly, migrants are more likely to come from high-migration villages.  
Our first attempt to separate social interactions from omitted variables is taking a village as the 
unit of observation and regressing migration percentage per village on village level variables including 
village population, whether the village is a poverty village, whether the village is a minority gathering 
place, average house value, average people per household, average age, average gender, land per 
household, average education of adults, distance to the nearest bus/rail/dock station, and township fixed 
effects. With an R-square of 0.578, this regression suggests that village-level observables only explain 
57.8% of the cross-village variation in migration. Figure 3 plots the histogram of residuals. The 
comparable dispersion of Figures 2 and 3 confirms that a large fraction of across-village migration 
variations are driven by something else other than fundamental socio-economic difference across villages. 
The cluster pattern of migration is more striking if we examine the distribution of migrating 
destination and industrial sector within each village. For example, the first row of Table 2 shows that, if 
we single out the most common industrial sector within each village, 75.1% of same-village migrants 
work in that sector. This number is much higher than what we would get if we repeat the exercise by 
township (51.93%), county (46.12%) or the whole area (46.48%).  Similarly, the percent of migrants to 
                                                 
21 This percentage is computed by 1- (avg distance of migrants)/(avg distance of non-migrants) = 1-5.35/6.16.    13 
the most common destination is more concentrated by village (63.8%) than by township (39.82%), county 
(31.86%), or the whole area (27.86%). The rest of Table 2 shows that same-village migrants are more 
clustered by the combination of destination, sector and surname than migrants from the same township or 
the same county. All these statistics support the conjecture that each village is a closely-knit social 
network and people interact with each other much more within the village than across villages. Given the 
facts that the average area per village is only 4 km
2 and villages in the same township are adjacent by 
definition, the migration clusters shown here is similar to the employment clusters documented in Bayer 
et al. (2008).  In Bayer et al. (2008), workers residing in the same census block tend to work in the same 
census block, as compared to residents of nearby census blocks. However, unlike Bayer et al. (2008), we 
use IV to further control for potential omitted village attributes.  
The last panel of Table A2 reports summary statistics for the percent of same-village adults that 
have a girl firstborn (conditional on the first birth is not a multiple), and the percent of same-village adults 
whose first birth is a multiple, both excluding adults in own household. Although the mean of these two 
variables are only different in the third decimal point across migrants and non-migrants, the t-statistics for 
the test of equal mean is very large (777.1 and 52.4) thanks to the large sample. As shown in Table 4, the 
correlation between one’s migration decision and whether this individual has a girl firstborn is highly 
significant, once we account for the gender of the adult under study.  
 
4 Basic Specification with Instruments 
For an individual i in household h, village v, township t and county k, the basic specification is: 
| i k i h v t iv i y x x x x y                          (1) 
where  i y  is a binary variable indicating whether individual i is a migrant in 2006;  k   denotes county 
fixed effects;  i x  denotes i’s individual attributes such as age, gender, year of schooling, whether the 
firstborn singleton is a girl, whether the first birth is multiple, whether the second birth is multiple, as well 
as the minimum and maximum ages of own children.  As discussed before, the variables on own children 
have missing values because some individuals do not have first or second birth, some individuals report 
children over age 16 which by our definition entails missing for firstborns, or some family structures are 
too complicated to pin down who is whose child (less than 1% of the sample). Later we show robustness 
checks using the sample of household heads under age 35 or the sample of two-adult families only.  
We control for a long list of household attributes in  h x , partly because most of our demographic 
variables are collected at the household level, partly because migration decisions may be made by the 
household as a whole instead of by each individual separately. Within h x , the key variables are the 
number of family members by age group (0-7, 7-16, 17- 23, 24-44, 45-59, 60+), whether there is at least   14 
one boy (aged 0-16) in the household, the amount of contract land, the debt status of the household, and 
the prevalence of the household head’s surname in the village. The last one captures the household’s 
political status and extent of social networks within the village. We do not control for the amount of land 
in use by household because this could be a result of migration. In section 5, we will examine how land in 
use of non-migrants correlates with the degree of peer migration. The most important village level 
variables ( v x ) includes the distance to the nearest bus/rail/dock station, access to drivable roads, the total 
adult population, and the total acreage of arable land. The latter two attempt to capture the degree of land-
population pressure in the village. Township level variables ( t x ) include the number of township-village-
enterprises, the presence of highway exit(s) in the township, and the registered population.  
The center of interest is the coefficient ( ) on the degree of peer migration in the same village 
( | iv y ), where  | iv y  is measured by the percent of same-village adults that migrate in 2006 (exclude all 
adults in household h). Equation (1) is estimated by a linear probability model. Errors are clustered by 
village (v) and adjusted for heteroscadasticity.  To the extent that omitted variables may capture similar 
socioeconomic status, similar preference or common environment , we expect  OLS  > 2SLS  . 
Validity of Instruments We propose three IVs for peer migration ( | iv y ): (1) the percent of 
same-village adults whose first birth involves two (or more) children; (2) the percent of same-village 
female labors that reside in the households with a girl firstborn; and (3) the percent of same-village male 
labors that reside in the households with a girl firstborn. All three IVs are conditional on the households 
for which we can clearly define the oldest child, excluding household h.   We focus on firstborns only, 
because births of higher order are more likely subject to sex selection (Ebenstein 2009).  
Both IV #2 and #3 capture the presence of girl firstborns, but we construct them separately 
because having a firstborn girl tends to encourage male adults of that household to migrate for work but 
discourage females from migration. Capturing this differential effect allows us to account for the fact that 
a household may have an uneven number of male and female labors as adult labors include not only the 
parents of the children, but also their uncles, aunties and grandparents if these adults live in the same 
household. Given the opposite effect of girl firstborn on male and female labors, exploiting the variations 
in adult gender enhances the strength of IV.  
Specifically, consider a village of four households: A, B, C and D. Household A has three adults: 
a husband, a wife, and the husband’s younger sister. Assume A has a girl firstborn. Household B is a 
nuclear family with a husband, a wife and a firstborn of boy. Household C has a husband, a wife, the   15 
husband’s father (below age 60), and a firstborn of boy. From D’s point of view, there are 4 female labor 
in neighboring households, 2 of which are in the household A with a girl firstborn. So the percent of 
female labor in the households with girl firstborns is 2/4. By the same logic, the percent of male labor in 
the households with girl firstborns is 1/4. These two percents are different because households A and C 
contain adult members other than the immediate parents of the firstborn. In our data, among households 
that have children (age 0-16) and adult labor (age 17-60), 0.90% involve adult siblings like A, 11.85% 
involve grandparents like C. This suggests that most variations between IV #2 and #3 come from three-
generation households.    
The validity of the instruments relies on two assumptions: first, the gender of -i’s firstborn and 
whether -i has multiples in the first birth must be correlated with -i’s own migration decision; second, 
these variables must be uncorrelated with the other households’ migration decision in the same village. In 
the absence of sex selection
22, the occurrence of twins, triplets, or a girl in the firstborn should be out of 
the control of a household. However, this does not automatically imply the second assumption holds 
because we encounter several measurement errors and the gender composition of adults within a 
household could be an endogenous choice conditional on fertility outcome.  
The most primary measurement error lies in the definition of firstborn. Since our data capture a 
one-time snapshot, the oldest child in our sample may not be the first birth if some elderly sibling(s) has 
grown out of age 16 or died before the data collection time. Conditional on households reporting the 
oldest child under age 17 alleviates but does not solve the problem. There might be some sex selection in 
favor of boys in the observed oldest child, even if the actual firstborns are balanced in sex. While we 
cannot rule out such sex selection, it is comforting to note that the percent of singleton girl in the observed 
first births (48.60%, versus 50.70% for singleton boy) is close to the natural ratio (James 1987 and Cai 
and Lavely 2005). Consistent with Ebenstein (2009), we also find significant gender differences in second 
and later-children.  As shown in Table 3, households with a girl firstborn are more likely to have a second 
child (71%) than those with a boy firstborn (68%).
23 Moreover, the second and later births are more likely 
to have (at least one) boy if the firstborn is a girl (87%) than otherwise (64%). Put it another way, the 
probability of having (at least one) boy and having (at least one) girl after firstborn is very close if the 
firstborn is a boy (64% vs. 64%), but far away if the firstborn is a girl (87% vs. 52%). All these numbers 
are larger than 50% because they include children born after the second births. In particular, 16.37% of all 
                                                 
22 In a rural area as poor as our sample, there is no fertility treatment service.  
23 The high percentage of second-birth conditional on a boy firstborn suggests that either the fertility control is not 
strict in the study area or many families are willing to pay for the monetary fine in association with a second birth 
after a boy firstborn.  This will not invalidate our study so long as there is a statistical difference of second birth 
conditional on the gender of the firstborn.    16 
children with valid firstborn data are third-born, and 5.51% are fourth or above.  Combined, households 
with a girl firstborn tend to have more children (2.28) than those of a boy firstborn (2.02). This confirms 
the conjecture that the gender of firstborn affects family size and the gender composition of later-borns. 
Another way to address the mis-definition of firstborn is computing IVs conditional on neighboring 
households that have all adults aged at or below 35. As shown below, our results are robust to this 
alternative definition.  
The second measurement error is that we may miscount two close-by births as twins because our 
data only report age in years instead of months or days. This data problem may lead to (1) an over-
estimate on the percent of multiple births, and (2) a higher-than-natural rate of mixed gender in these 
multiples. The latter could occur if a girl first-born in January motivates the birth of a subsequent boy in 
November or December. To check these concerns, we find that among all the first births the likelihood of 
having two or more children at the same age is 0.70%, which is consistent with the natural probability of 
multiple births in both the international literature (James 1987) and the period of time in China before the 
implementation of one-child policy (Cai and Lavely 2005). Regarding gender mix, the percent of multiple 
firstborns with mixed gender (0.27%) is slightly higher than that of all boys (0.24%) and all girls (0.19%). 
To address the potential measurement issue, later we show that our IV results are robust to (1) not using 
the percent of neighboring households having multiples as an IV; and (2) restricting the calculation of IV 
to the households whose oldest same-age children are all boys.  
Even if the fertility outcome of firstborns is exogenous, one may argue that the number of female 
or male labors in a household is correlated with the fertility outcome or adult composition in another 
household. This could happen if the two household heads are close relatives. For example, consider two 
middle-age brothers who have a mother of 55 years old.  If one brother has a girl firstborn, he may invite 
the mother to live in and take care of the baby so that he can migrate out for work. This change of living 
arrangement may leave the other brother more (or less) likely to migrate. This story generates a potential 
correlation between one brother’s error term and his IVs. Our data do not indicate blood relationship. As a 
robustness check, we restrict IVs to neighboring households that have different surnames as the studied 
household. While this solution is imperfect, a robust finding helps address the econometric concern.   
A related concern is that the fertility outcome of two households may be correlated directly either 
because genetic links or peer effects in fertility. This does not generate a problem for our IV strategy if we 
control for the number of children and gender mix in one’s own household and such control is sufficient 
to capture all the correlations between one’s own migration decision and fertility outcome. However, an 
econometric bias could arise if the actual relationship of migration and fertility is non-linear. Restricting 
IVs to neighboring households with different surnames may limit the genetic link of fertility; and running 
the same specification without controlling for self fertility may provide a robustness check.   17 
The discussion above focuses on a potential correlation between the IVs and the error term. The 
other assumption for the IV validity is that individual –i's fertility outcome must be correlated with -i’s 
own migration decision. As a first test, we regress -i’s migration status ( i y ) on the gender of -i’s 
firstborn, controlling for nothing else but county fixed effects. As shown in Table 4 Column 1, this adult-
level regression suggests a significant, positive correlation between adult’s migration and whether the 
household has a girl firstborn. This correlation hardly changes if we add -i’s age, education and distance 
to the nearest bus station in the regression (Column 2).  
The third column of Table 4 includes an interaction of -i being female and having a girl firstborn. 
Results suggest that having a girl firstborn tends to affect men and women in opposite ways: men (fathers, 
uncles and grandfathers) are more likely to migrate, probably because they need to earn more income for 
an increased family size; women (mothers, aunties and grandmothers) are less likely to migrate, probably 
because they have to stay home to bear the second child and take care of young children. Note that the 
separate correlation for men and women are 4-6 times larger than the pooling effect, which explains why 
our IVs exploit the adult gender composition in the households with a girl firstborn. 
In addition to the need of females at home for childbearing and child care and the demand for 
males to earn more financial resources away from home, the correlation between migration and having a 
girl firstborn may be also driven by the possibility that households with boys have different preferences 
for income and time. A household with strong boy preference may be more willing to take close care of 
boys, which implies a smaller tendency to work away from home. Alternatively, households with a boy 
may want to accumulate more wealth so that they can build a house when the boy is ready to marry; and 
migration is one way to achieve the goal. One may also argue that because parents rely on their sons for 
elderly care, they may have fewer incentives to work away from home and save for themselves if they 
have sons.  Tan (2003) suggests somewhat the opposite: while parents may still have such perception in 
their mind (which justifies the boy preference in fertility), parents’ actual economic return from sons is no 
higher than that of daughters. The main reasons are (1) adult sons tend to give less percent of their own 
income to the parents, (2) more and more adult sons do not live with parents after marriage, and (3) 
daughters also offer elderly care to the parents, especially if the parents have no sons.  
As shown in Columns 4-6 of Table 4, a household that has a girl firstborn is likely to have a 
larger family size, a greater number of children, and a smaller likelihood of having any boy. To the extent 
that the family size and gender mix of children affect -i’s migration decision via the above-mentioned 
channels, -i’s migration decision is correlated with whether -i’s first singleton birth is a girl and whether -i 
has had a multiple birth(s). We will recheck these correlations in the 2SLS results as we control for one’s 
own household composition and gender mix of own children directly in Specification (1).    18 
Conditional on the IV validity, one may suspect a weak IV problem as the percent of girl 
firstborns should be close to 50%, especially for large villages.
24 As a first check, we note that the percent 
of girl firstborns ranges from 17.7% to 78.5% at the village level, the median number of adult labors per 
village is roughly 800, and the distribution of village size is 30.1% with 100-1000 adults, 48.8% with 
1000-2000, 15.88% with 2000-3000 and 5.19% with 3000+. This suggests that we will have fair amount 
of variation in our instruments. To be sure, the IV results reported below are accompanied with a 
conditional likelihood ratio (LR) test for weak instruments.
25  
Key results The key results of specification (1) are presented in Table 5. In addition to the OLS 
results in Column (1), we present three columns of IV estimates: the first using the percent of same-
village adults having multiples in the first birth as the only IV for the percent of peer migration in the 
same village; the second using the percents of female and male labors residing in the households with a 
girl firstborn as IVs; and the third using all three IVs. As shown in Panel A, all three IVs are highly 
significant and have expected signs in the first stage. In particular, peers having multiple firstborns 
increase the propensity of peer migration, while more female (male) labors residing in the girl-firstborn 
families have a negative (positive) effect on peer migration.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows the key 2SLS estimates, while other coefficients from the same 
specification are reported in Appendix Table A2. One consistent finding across the four columns is that 
migrants are younger, more educated, and have more access to drivable roads. They are also more likely 
to be male, and have less house value and less contract land. These patterns are consistent with the 
existing literature on both international migration (Rosenzweig 1988, Lucas 1997) and internal migration 
within China (Zhao 1999a & 1999b). The number of household members in any age group has a positive 
effect on migration, suggesting that the need for more resources to support a large family dominates the 
need to take care of family members. The coefficient of having a boy in the household is negative, 
suggesting that boy preference may hinder migration because the demand for extra fertility is lower,  
parents (and grandparents) want to spend more times with boys, or they can rely on their sons (and 
grandsons) to provide elderly care and therefore have fewer incentives to work and save for themselves. 
The key 2SLS coefficient for the effects of peer migration, , is 0.631 in column (2) and 
increases moderately to 0.768 (column 2) and 0.727 (column 3) if we change IVs. These magnitudes are 
economically large, implying that 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of peer migration has the 
same influence as an increase of education by 7-8 years.  All three estimates are smaller than the OLS 
                                                 
24 Similar argument applies to the percent of multiple birth. 
25 We adopt conditional LR because it is more robust than Anderson-Rubin and score tests (Andrews and Stock 
2007). 
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estimate (0.930), which suggests that  OLS   tends to over-estimate the actual magnitude of social 
interactions because omitted individual or community variables affect self and peer migrations in similar 
ways. All three 2SLS estimates pass the conditional likelihood ratio test for weak instruments, with tight 
intervals of   well above zero. As reported in Panel C, the reduced form regressions corresponding to 
columns (2) to (4) show similar statistical significance, which suggest that one’s own migration decision 
is indeed correlated with neighbors’ fertility outcome and family composition. An over-identification test 
for the three IVs yields an F-statistics of 147.9 with p-value less than 1%. One explanation is that the IVs 
affect different parts of peers hence implying different types and magnitudes of social interactions.  
Taking Table 5 Column (4) as the preferred specification, the 2SLS estimate suggests that every 
one percentage point increase in the percent of same-village adults migrating away will increase one’s 
own migration probability by 0.727 percentage point.  Two factors may explain this seemingly large 
effect of social interactions: First, most Chinese rural-to-urban migrants leave families at the origin and 
therefore have plenty of opportunities to communicate with people in the same village. Second, due to the 
lack of job information via formal channels, potential migrants must rely on friends, relatives, and other 
social networks. Given the geographic sparseness of rural areas, current migrants in the same village is 
likely the most important source of job information in remote destinations.   
Robustness Checks The following robustness checks ensure that the reported effects of social 
interactions are not driven by sample selection, variable construction, or invalid instruments. 
To address the concern that working away from home for 1-2 months is not migration, we 
redefine migration as working away for at least 6 months. Column (2) of Table 6 shows that the 2SLS 
coefficient (using all three IVs) is similar (0.674 vs. 0.727). The concern of omitted variables at the 
township level leads us to replace county fixed effects with township fixed effects in the specification 
with all three IVs. The key coefficient is similar (0.789) and remains significant at 1%. Column (4) 
excludes own fertility outcomes from the right hand side, to address the concern that there may be direct 
peer effects in fertility and linear specification is not sufficient to control for the impact of self fertility on 
self migration. This concern is ungrounded, as the key coefficient is very similar (0.741 vs. 0.727).  
Regarding the IV validity, Table 6 Column (5) reports that conditioning the percent of neighbors’ 
multiple birth on all-boy twins yields a similar coefficient of peer migration (0.681) as compared to 0.631 
in the Column 2 of Table 5.  To address the measurement issue of firstborns, Column (6) of Table 6 
restricts the percent of peers having a girl firstborn to the households that have all adults aged at or below 
35. The magnitude of the key 2SLS result is lower than before (0.622 versus 0.768) but remains 
significant.  Column (7) of Table 6 limits the percent of peers having multiples or a girl firstborn to the 
households that have a different surname as the one under study. Obtaining similar results (0.810) in this 
specification suggests that the observed correlation between self and peer migration is not driven by   20 
households being close relatives. In all these checks, the key coefficient has a larger standard error than 
the main results, as the alternative IVs utilize fewer variations in the data. 
Additional robustness checks consider two extra groups of peers. The first group is the adults that 
live in the same township but not in the same village. Since township covers a set of adjacent villages, 
same-township adults may communicate across villages. Column (8) of Table 6 reports the 2SLS 
estimates including both the percent of peer migration in the same village and the percent of peer 
migration in the same township but different villages. Both are instrumented by all three IVs constructed 
for the relevant peers. Results suggest that peers from same township but different villages have a positive 
effect on one’s own migration decision, but its magnitude (0.0108) is smaller than that of same-village 
peers (0.782) and statistically close to zero.  This confirms a definition of social network by village.  
In Column (9), we add information about the second peer group, namely the percent of migration 
for the adults that live in the same household. In theory, migration within a household may be positively 
correlated due to social interactions or unobserved household factors. The correlation could also be 
negative if the household makes individual migration decisions jointly (for example, insurance concern 
may motivate the household to diversify in agricultural and non-agricultural activities), or if there are 
unobserved individual factors that are different across family members. Unfortunately, the gender of 
firstborns and the occurrence of multiple births are applicable to both parents, hence we cannot use them 
for the percent of same-household adults that migrate. For this reason, the regression reported in Column 
(8) includes same-household migration, but do not use any IV for this variable.  Although we still use IVs 
for peers outside the household, the coefficient on same-household peers does not necessarily identify the 
causal effect within a household.  Keeping this in mind, Column (8) suggests that there is some positive 
correlation in the migration decisions of self and other household members, but its magnitude is lower 
than the effects from other people in the same village. The relatively smaller coefficient on the percent of 
same household migration indicates that insurance concern may be one non-trivial factor in the migration 
decisions within a household. 
To address concerns on potential sample selection, Column (10) of Table 6 conditions the 
analysis sample on the households that have only two adults. These households have a simple relationship 
among family members, which allow us to clearly define fertility history. The effect of peer migration is 
slightly lower for this sub-group of population (0.604 vs. 0.727 for full sample), probably because two-
adult families have a hard time finding  live-in help for child care which is much needed if parents stay 
away from home for a long time. The last column of Table 6 excludes minority (non-Han) gathering 
villages because minorities are not subject to the one-child policy and minorities are much less likely to 
migrate than the Hans. The 2SLS effect of peer migration changes little (0.710 vs. 0.727).    21 
In an unreported table, we also explore whether the 2SLS effect of peer migration is non-linear. 
We first regress self migration on all the control variables in Specification 1 and refer to the residual from 
as resid1. We then regress each IV on the same control variables and name its residual as resid2, resid3, 
and resid4. In the third step, we regress resid1 on a quadratic function of resid2, resid3, and resid4. The 
results suggest that all three IVs affect one’s migration decision non-linearly. The effect from the percent 
of neighbors having multiple birth in the firstborn is concave and its positive sign disappears when the 
percent of multiples reaches 3.4%. This is very high considering the average is 0.7% in our sample.  The 
effects from the percentages of female and male labors residing in the households with a girl firstborn are 
always positive and slightly convex, starting from nearly 0.8.      
 
5. Mechanisms of Social Interactions 
The IV results presented above help identify social interactions from omitted individual or 
village-level variables, but they do not identify the mechanisms underlying these social interactions. This 
goal of this section is empirically identifying three types of social interactions.  
The first is the social network effects as argued in Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and 
Carrington et al. (1996): migrants that belong to the same social network may help each other reduce 
migration cost and identify job opportunities at the destination. For example, if a young female migrant 
performs well in a manufacturing factory, the employer may ask her to help find new employees like her. 
Since most rural migrants have limited social networks in the city, most likely she will pass this 
information to her peers at home. Even if the factory that the migrant is working for does not need new 
employees, she may hear about job opportunities in similar factories in the same city. Such information is 
useful for peers to consider when they decide whether and where to migrate. If peers migrate together to 
one city, they often share housing, which makes it easy to exchange job information during job search. 
Social network theories imply that migrants from the same village should be more likely to 
cluster in the same destination and same industrial sector. This statement also implies that the village 
level cluster must differ substantially across villages, even though these villages are observationally 
similar. Table 2 already presents evidence in support of this prediction. To the extent that one is most 
familiar with job opportunities that are specific to one’s own age, gender and education group, or one is 
more willing to share job information with relatives, the social network effects should be the strongest 
among villagers of same age, gender, education and surname. The strength of the social network effects 
also depends on alternative channels of information, which predicts that they should be higher in the 
remote villages that have limited access to road or remote job information.  
The second type of social interactions is peer pressure at the origin. Suppose inside a village, 
migration is viewed as a positive signal of ability. Observing more peers migrating out of the village   22 
could leave a non-migrant feel inferior. If such pressure exists, we should see stronger peer effects within 
similar age, gender and education, but not necessarily within the same destination for the same sector.
26  
Unlike the above two mechanisms which both predict a positive correlation between self and peer 
migration, the third type of social interaction could suggest a negative correlation: for example, the more 
people migrate out of the village, the more agricultural resources and opportunities will be left for those 
that stay and therefore increase the opportunity cost of migration for these people. The positive  2SLS   
found in our main specification suggests that this general equilibrium effect does not dominate the social 
network effects or peer pressure at the origin. That being said, we can test the general equilibrium effects 
directly by looking at whether a non-migrant household uses more land if it is located in a high-migration 
village. Like peer pressure at the origin, general equilibrium effects focus on omitted variables at the 
origin and therefore do not predict migration cluster by destination and industrial sector.  
Empirical Evidence Our empirical detection of social interaction mechanisms starts with two 
revised specifications. First, suppose we classify adults into nine age groups (17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 
36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60) and individual i belongs to age group a. The following specification 
examines how the percent of migration of age group 1 to 9 affects individual i’s own migration decision 
conditional on the sample of age group a:  
  
1 2 9 | 1 , | 2 , | 9 , | .... . i a k i h v i a v i a v i a v i y x x x y y y                      (2) 
The percent of peer migration in group a ( ,| i av y ) is instrumented with the three IVs as described above, 
but each IV is constructed within the adults of group a in the same village. Similar specification can be 
applied to grouping by other demographics such as gender, surname or education.  
Following Specification (2), Appendix Tables A3, A4, A5 and A6 report the 2SLS regression 
results for adults grouped by age, gender, surname and education. A general patterns standing out of these 
tables is that the effects of peer migration are the strongest for the adults within similar age, gender, 
education and surname. This finding is consistent with social network effects or peer pressure but not 
with the general equilibrium effects. Social interactions across different demographic groups are 
occasionally significant and asymmetric: for example, males have significantly positive effects on 
females and villagers aged 36-40 have significantly positive effects on those of 26-35, but the reverse 
effects are close to zero. These findings could reflect some strength of social network effects, as males (or 
the old) are more able to help females (the young) in a stranger community than vice versa. One 
exception is that migrants between 17 and 20 have some positive influence on older migrants and the 
                                                 
26 The peer pressure could be related to destination or industrial sector if going to a specific destination, say Beijing, 
has a positive signaling value in the eyes of peers. In the data, destination- or industrial-specific peer pressure is not 
distinguishable from the social network effects, not only because they are observational equivalent, but also because 
such peer pressure is likely to rely on the help from earlier migrants to result in clustered migration.    23 
effect declines with the age gap. This is probably because 17-20 is one of the prime ages of migration and 
this group is more acceptable to new information.
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Specification 2 is applicable to the sub-samples grouped by age, gender, education and surname, 
but not by destination and industrial sector. This is because destination and sector are choices made by 
migrants conditional on migration. To detect social interactions by destination and sector, we return to the 
full sample. Suppose there are n potential destinations and
d
i y  is denoted one if individual i migrates to 
destination d, 0 otherwise. We then regress 
d
i y  on the percent of same-village adults migrating to 
destinations 1, 2, … n.  This specification can be written as: 
12
1 | 2 | | ... .
n d dd d
i k i h v iv iv n iv i y x x x y y y                         (3) 
The coefficients,  12 { , ,.... } n    , capture the correlation between self destination and peer destination, 
which could be driven by social interactions, or a destination-specific omitted variable that affects both 
self and peers. Unfortunately, our IVs are only relevant for whether peers migrate or not, not where to 
migrate or what to do after migration. To identify social interactions by destination or industrial sector, 
we must find additional IVs for each destination or each industrial sector.  
We compute the travel distance from village v to destination dj by summing up the distance of the 
village to the nearest bus/rail/dock station, the distance from the station to the township it belongs to, and 
the distance from the township to the destination. For destinations within the sampled province, we define 
the distance as distance from village v to the provincial capital. For destinations that fall in the residual 
category of “others”, we compute the distance from village v to the biggest city of an adjacent province. 
Based on the distance variables, we define the instruments for  |
j d
iv y  as the distance from v to dj  times the 
three instruments used in Specification 1.  Because individual i’s decision to migrate to dj will take into 
account the distance to all alternative destinations, the 2SLS regression of |
j d
iv y  on  
1
||| ,... ,...
j n d d d
iv iv iv yyy   
also controls for the distances from v to   1,..., ,...., jn d d d  directly. Since we run a regression of  |
j d
iv y  for 
each destination separately with county fixed effects, any unobserved correlation between the origin 
county and the destination is already accounted for.  
It is more difficult to construct sector-specific instruments because we know nothing about the 
employers of migrants. However, there are natural demographic differences across sector: most 
construction workers are male, most service industry workers are female, and manufacturing jobs usually 
requires more skills than construction and service jobs. All these jobs prefer young to old. In light of these 
                                                 
27 Given the short history of the recent migration wave, we do not expect a stronger effect of old on young than 
young on old. In fact, adults over age 30 are less likely to migrate in our sample probably because they have family 
to take care of in the origin.    24 
variations, we first compute the percent female, the percent of each age group (16-22,23-29, 30-39, 40+), 
and the percent of each education group (6 years of schooling, 7-9, 10-12, 13+) for each village. We then 

















iv y (other).  Like the destination regressions, the 2SLS regression specific to each 
sector controls for the percent of female, age groups, and education groups at the village level.  
Tables 7 and 8 report the 2SLS regression of Specification 3 for migration choice of destination 
and industrial sector. It is apparent that migrants from the same village are highly clustered by destination 
and industrial sector. All the coefficients on the diagonal (indicating the same destination or the same 
sector) are positive, significant, and close to one. Two of them are even slightly bigger than one 
(destinations A and B), but t-test suggests that neither of them is statistically different from one. In 
contrast, most off-diagonal coefficients (indicating peer effects across destination and sector) are 
insignificant, some are even significantly negative because different destinations (or sectors) are potential 
substitutes. In unreported tables, we replace county fixed effects with township fixed effects in both 
regressions. The results are similar: diagonal coefficients are all positive (ranging from 0.915 to 1.078) 
and significant with 99% confidence; but off-diagonal ones are either negative or close to zero. This 
suggests that migrants from the same village tend to cluster in destination and sector, much more than 
migrants from different villages of the same township.  To put these findings in context, the within-
village cluster by sector is most consistent with villagers sharing job information at or about the 
destination; while the cluster by destination could be consistent with both the reduction of moving cost 
and the sharing of job information.  
To address whether migrants leaves more agricultural resources and opportunities for the non-
migrants in the same village, Appendix Table 7 regresses land in use of each non-migrant household (i.e. 
no adult migrates in the household) on the percent of same-village adults that migrated in 2006. We use 
the same IVs (all three) for peer migration as in Specification 1. The OLS results confirm a positive 
correlation between peer migration and the land use of non-migrants, but this correlation is no longer 
significant once we use IVs to control for omitted individual or village-level characteristics. In unreported 
tables, we try the same specification on other agricultural activities such as short-run employment for 
agricultural labor, fertilizer use, and the adoption of agricultural technology. Results are similar to that of 
land use: most show significant correlations with peer migration in OLS, but the significance disappears 
when we use IVs. These results suggest that even if general equilibrium effects exist, they are likely to 
reflect omitted characteristics, or being absorbed by remaining members of the migrating households and 
do not cause significant spillovers on other households in the same village.   25 
Heterogeneous effects of peer migration So far the strong cluster of migrants by destination 
and industrial sector suggests that the most likely mechanism is the social network effects: peer migrants 
may help each other reduce moving costs and locate job opportunities at the same destination. Recall that 
the social network theory also implies heterogeneous strength of networks: the origins that are more 
difficult to travel from or have less information about the outside world should rely more on social 
networks. Table 10 includes the interactions of peer migration and distance from the respondent’s 
residential village to the nearest bus station, the center of the county, the center of the studied area, and 
the provincial capital. In the last column we also interact peer migration with whether the respondent 
resides in a village that has access to TV signals. All regressions use the same three IVs for peer 
migration as in Specification 1. Results suggest that longer distance to the nearest station and county 
center does not imply larger effects of peer migration. However, longer distances to the area center and 
provincial center do have a positive and statistically significant effect on the strength of peer influence. 
This result is sensible because the area we study is not large and provincial capital is the most important 
stop if one wants to take railway or bus to other provinces. In comparison, the strength of peer migration 
is not sensitive to TV access, confirming the fact that there is little job information via formal channels.    
Alternative explanation The strong clustering by age, gender, education, destination and 
industrial sector could also be driven by local governments organizing group migration to a specific 
destination or by far-away employers recruiting a large number of workers from the same origin. While 
we cannot rule out organized efforts, they are unlikely the driving force for the following reasons.  
First of all, both the 2004 shortage of migrating labor and the 2006 nationwide promotion of 
migrant labor markets, suggest that most organized efforts, if they exist, took place after 2004. In fact, 
almost all the major events we can find in the government documents of the data area in terms of 
organized migration happened in October 2006, as a response to the central government policy.  
According to the local newspaper of our study area, 65% of the migrants that worked away from home in 
2006 have migrated out of the area by 2004, and 88.5% have migrated by 2005. Among the people that 
started to migrate in 2006, only 9.8% were organized by the Department of Labor in the local 
governments. These numbers suggest that the majority of the migrants observed in our 2006 cross-
sectional data did not migrate because of government-organized migration or recruiting.  
   Second, for the organized migration or group recruiting to explain our key empirical findings, it 
must be organized at the village level because we already control for county fixed effects and results are 
robust if we further control for township fixed effects. All the anecdotes we can find in the mass media 
regarding organized migration or organized recruiting cover administrative units at or above the township   26 
level. For example
28 in 2006, a vocational high school of a sampled county has signed a two-year contract 
with a city of destination A to train 1,500 adults per year. Graduates of the training program are 
guaranteed to work for an electronics factory or a shoe factory in destination B.  In 2007, the Chairman of 
a large employer visited the sampled area and negotiated with the area government for a group labor 
contract of 2,000 migrants. A large town in the sampled area has actively searched for job opportunities 
since 1984 and the total number of migrants from this particular town has exceeded 21,000 by the end of 
2008. All these activities, if equally effective for the whole administrative unit (area, county, or town), 
should already be controlled for in our fixed effects.  
The remaining question is whether organized migration or recruiting occurs at the village level. If 
such village-level activities are correlated with whether a village has more firstborns being girls or more 
births being multiples, their effects will survive the instruments. In theory, this possibility is not zero: for 
example, if a village has more girl firstborns and therefore has a larger family size on average, the village 
head may face greater land-population pressure hence is more motivated to search for migration 
opportunities. Since all the firstborns computed in our sample are under age 16 at the time of the survey, 
the above story will only hold in reality if the village leader is sophisticated and forward-looking enough 
to predict the land-population pressure in the future.  
This argument leads to two empirical tests: in the first test, we control for the demographics 
(gender, education, and military experience) of village cadres
29, which hopefully capture some 
unobserved village-level activities. As Appendix Table A8, adding cadre demographics generates no 
change in our main results (0.735 versus 0.727). In the mean time, all the cadre demographics are 
insignificant from zero. In the second test, we reconstruct all the IVs based on children of age 0-12 
instead of 0-16. Again, results change little: the 2SLS coefficient for peer migration is 0.635 (vs. 0.727).  
To summarize, both anecdotes and empirical analysis lead us to believe that organized migration 
or organized recruiting is not the main reason driving the clustered pattern of migration. The most likely 
explanation is that people of the same village share job information and help each other reduce moving 
costs at the destination. This conclusion is consistent with the importance of social networks as cited in a 
number of individual surveys conducted within China (Section 3).  
 
6. Potential Implications of Peer Migration 
What does peer migration imply for the migration rate in the long run? Typically, social network 
effects are assumed symmetric between self and peers. This symmetric assumption is unlikely to hold in 
                                                 
28 To protect data confidentially, we cannot provide precise citations for these anecdotes. They are available upon 
referee request.   
29 Village cadres refer to the village head and the Communist Party leader of the village.    27 
the context of migration: almost all the empirical studies on migrant networks emphasize that previous 
migrants can influence non-migrants to move away; but once a migrant has moved, his or her future 
migration decision is unlikely to be affected by those that stay at the origin, unless the migrant returns 
permanently and reconsiders migration next year. Given the fact that only 7-8% of Chinese migrants 
return home the year after moving (Sheng 2008, Zhao 2002), we suspect the social network effects 
identified in our study is mostly driven by previous migrants affecting new migrants but not vice versa.  
Unfortunately, we cannot test this conjecture because our data is only cross-sectional. Rather, we 
assume that the social network effects found in the study is restricted to the single direction from previous 
migrants to non-migrants. Under this assumption, social network effects imply that supporting a few rural 
residents to migrate to the city could lead their neighbors to do the same thing, every round embodies a 
larger number of new migrants, and new migrants will influence the remaining villagers in the next round.  
To illustrate this snowball effect, we consider a village of population one. For simplicity, the 
population is assumed to be homogenous (say young adults subject to the risk of migration) and never 
ages.  Suppose the government subsidizes 1% of the population to migrate to the city in year one. Our 
peer effect estimate suggests that every 1% increase in peer migration will increase the remaining 
population’s probability of migration by 0.727%. Assuming this peer influence does not change over 
time, we simulate the percentage of migrating population for the next thirty year in three scenarios: first, 
we assume every year 8% of the existing migrants will return to the rural area and these people will be 
subject to the risk of migration as much as the non-migrant population. In the second scenario, the 
likelihood of returning is 8% but only half of the returning migrants are subject to the risk of migration 
next year.  In comparison, the third scenario assumes all the returning migrants never migrate again.  
Figure 4 shows the simulated migration path for all three scenarios. As we expect, scenario #1 
will converge to a steady province with 89% of migrants, at which time the percentage of new migrants is 
equal to the percentage of returning migrants. In the other two scenarios, the returning migrants’ inertia to 
migrate in the future becomes a greater countervailing force against the social multiplier effect. As a 
result, the percentage of migrating population reaches the maximum of 76.8% in year 14 for scenario #2 
(69.6% in year 13 for scenario 3) and gradually declines afterwards.  While each of these three scenarios 
are counterfactual (and inconsistent with the reality because we do not account for aging, marriage, 
childbearing and other life events), they suggest that a small initiation of migration could lead to a large 
wave of migration in the next few decades.  
In addition to the snowball effect, peer migration could have large, persistent, and sometimes 
alarming implications for other socio-economic issues. For example, the railway traffic in the 40-day rush 
around the Spring Festival sets a new record every year: the 2009 traffic is 10.6% higher than 2008, and   28 
2008 is 11% higher than 2007.
30 Although the central government has invested a lot to enhance the supply 
of railway service, it is difficult to catch up with the soaring demand. Railway tickets are extremely hard 
to get during the rush days, and many railway stations, especially those in large cities, have 24-hour 
police in order to reduce crime and accidents. The clustered pattern of migration found in our data also 
implies that the traffic between a migration origin and a migration destination is likely clustered, which 
could create serious congestion on specific routes even if the overall market is not crowded.  
Another implication of peer migration is significant demographic change in high-migration 
villages. Since migrants are more likely to be male, young and better-educated, and the peer effects are 
the strongest among similar age and gender, the remaining population of high migration villages is likely 
to be concentrated in children, women and the elderly. To support this argument, we group the 3,950 
villages in our sample according to whether its migrants-to-adults ratio falls in the brackets: 0-10%, 10-
20%, 20-30%, or 30% and above. For each of the four village groups, we plot the headcount of migrants 
and non-migrants separately at every integer age (Appendix Figures A3-A6).  In all four figures, the age 
distribution has small spikes every 2-3 years. One potential reason is some rural households tend to 
calculate age by lunar calendar
31, but this is unlikely the main driver because the birth rate recorded by the 
local government by the regular calendar varies greatly from year to year.
32 
Comparing the four figures, we conclude that the overall population structure is similar across 
groups but because of migration, the villages that have the highest migration percentage (>30%) are 
significantly short of young and middle age adults. The difference in the percent of female is less striking: 
in the highest-migration villages, the percent of female adults in the remaining non-migrant population is 
51%, as compared to 47.4% in the lowest migration villages. These migration-generated demographic 
changes could have profound impact on agricultural productivity, child development, and elderly care. 
Lastly, there is no doubt that peer migration clustered by destination and industrial sector 
establishes a strong employment link between origin and destination. This link could affect the 
vulnerability of the macro economy.   Take the on-going economic recession as an example.  Since a 
large fraction of rural migrants are concentrated in export-oriented manufacturing, the reduced 
international demand in 2008 and the subsequent return of unemployed labor has created serious 
problems for inland provinces.
33 This problem could be worsened by clustered migration because it 
reduces the origin area’s ability to diversify the macroeconomic risk.  
                                                 
30 2008 data: http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2008-03/03/content_7704253.htm. 2007 data: http://info.cec-
ceda.org.cn/jtwl/pages/20070207_41568_7_3.html￿。 
31 Some rural households count age as the number of lunar years that a person’s life has covered regardless of the 
month of birth. For example, if a person was born in lunar December, she could be two year old in the lunar count 
even before she reaches her first birthday.  
32 The actual birth rate in the surveyed area ranges from 1.28% (1996, 2006) to 2.00% (2003) and 2.23% (2001).  
33 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-03/02/content_10928532.htm.   29 
7. Conclusion 
The unprecedented labor migration in China provides an excellent opportunity to deepen our 
understanding of whether, why and where laborers migrate. Constructing instruments based on whether 
neighbors have a girl firstborn and whether neighbors have multiple birth(s), we find a large, positive, and 
significant effect of social interactions within a village. Evidence suggests that most of the effect is driven 
by co-villagers helping each other reduce moving costs and find job opportunities at the same destination.  
The social network effects found in our study implies that a policy that subsidizes a small fraction 
of the rural population to migrate could have a large and persistent effect on subsequent migrations from 
the same village. Interestingly, not only does the snowball effect help transfer agricultural labor to non-
agricultural activities, it could also create a number of socio-economic implications including a dramatic 
demographic change in the high migration villages, transportation congestion, and increased vulnerability 
to potential macroeconomic shocks. Evaluating the impact of migration on these social-economic issues 
will be a promising direction for future research.   
 
8. References 
     Aizer, Anna and Janet Currie (2004) "Networks Or Neighborhoods? Correlations In The Use Of 
Publicly-Funded Maternity Care In California," Journal of Public Economics 88(12): 2573-2585. 
     Andrews, Donald W.K. and James H. Stock (2007) “Inference with Weak Instruments,” Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics, Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress of the Econometric 
Society, Vol. III, ed. by R. Blundell, W. K. Newey, and T. Persson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.  
     Angrist, Joshua D and Evans William N (1998) “Children and Their Parents' Labour 
Supply: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Family Size” American Economic Review, vol. 88(3) : 
450-77. 
     Angrist, Joshua D. and Kevin Lang (2004) “Does School Integration Generate Peer Effects? Evidence 
from Boston's Metco Program” American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 5 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1613-1634.  
     Bao, Shuming, Örn B. Bodvarsson, Jack W. Hou, and Yaohui Zhao (2007) “Interprovincial Migration 
in China: the Effects of Investment and Migrant Networks.” IZA Discussion No. 2924.  
     Bartel, Ann P. (1989) “Where Do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?” Journal of Labor Economics 7(4): 
371-391. 
     Bayer, Patrick; Stephen L. Ross and Giorgio Topa (2008) "Place of Work and Place of Residence: 
Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, 116(6), pages 
1150-1196, December. 
     Becker, Gary (1975) Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (2
nd Edition), New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  
     Borjas, George J. (1994) “The Economics of Immigration,” Journal of Economic Literature 32(4): 
1667-1717. 
     Caces, F; F Arnold; J.T. Fawcett and R.W.Gardner(1985) “Shadow Household and Competing 
Auspices: Migration Behavior in Philippines” Journal of Development Economics, 17:5-25.  
     Cai, Fang (1996) “An economic analysis for labor migration and mobility” Social Sciences in China 
(Spring): 120–35.   30 
     Cai, Fang; Albert Park; and Yaohui Zhao “The Chinese Labor Market in the Reform Era” forthcoming 
in Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski, eds., China’s Great Economic Transformation (Cambridge 
University Press).  
     Cai, Fang and Wang Dewen (2003) “Migration As Marketization: What Can We Learn from China’s 
2000Census Data?” The China Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 : 73–93. 
     Cai, Yong and William Lavely (2003) “China’s Missing Girls: Numerical Estimates and Effects on 
Population Growth” The China Review, Vol. 3, No. 2: 13–29. 
     Calvo-Armengol, Tony and Matthew Jackson (2004) “The Effects of Social Networks on Employment 
and Inequality” American Economic Review 94(3): 426-454. 
     Carrington, W.J; E. Detragiache and T. Vishwanath (1996) “Migration with Endogenous Moving 
Costs” American Economic Review, 86(4): 909-30. 
     Chen, Jinyong (2006) “Reform of Hukou Policy and Rural-urban Migration in China” in Fang Cai and 
Zansheng Bai edited Labor Migration in Transition China 2006, Social Science Academy Press (China).  
     Chen, Jun(2005)” On the Problem of Information Shortage Encountered by Peasant-workers in Job 
Hunting”, Hunan Social Sciences, 2005(5): 83-85. 
     Chen, Zhao; Shiqing Jiang; Ming Lu; and Hiroshi Sato (2008) “How do Heterogeneous Social 
Interactions Affect the Peer Effect in Rural–Urban Migration: Empirical Evidence from China.” LICOS 
Discussion Papers 22408, Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven. 
     Du, Yang, Albert Park, and Sangui Wang(2005) “Migration and rural poverty in China”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 33:4 (2005): 688-709. 
     Duflo, Esther and Emmanuel Saez (2002): “The Role of Information and Social Interactions in 
Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 815-842. 
     Du, Yin (2000) “Rural Labor Migration in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Its Features and the 
Macro context” in West, Loraine & Zhao, Yaohui edited Rural Labor Flows in China, Institute of East 
Asian Studies, University of California.  
     Ebenstein, Avraham (2009) ”Estimating a Dynamic Model of Sex Selection in China” March 2009, 
job market paper.  
     Fei, John C. H and Ranis Gustav (1964) Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and 
Policy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
     Hare, Denise and Shukai Zhao (2000) “Labor Migration as a Rural Development Strategy: A View 
from the Migration Origin.” In West, Loraine & Zhao, Yaohui edited Rural Labor Flows in China, 
Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.  
     Huang, Ping and Frank N. Pieke (2003) “China Migration Country Study” Paper presented at the 
Regional Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia, Dhaka, June 21–
24, 2003. 
     Ioannides, Yannis and Linda Datcher Loury (2004) "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects 
and Inequality" Journal of Economic Literature 42(4): 1056-1093). 
     James,W.H (1987) “The Human Sex ratio, Part1: A Review of the Literature” Human Biology 59:721–
752. 
     Jian, Yulan(2005)” China's rural labor force transfer of the status quo and countermeasures”, The 
Rural Economics, 2005(5): 110-112. 
     Kling, Jeffrey R; Jeffrey B. Liebman and Lawrence F. Katz (2007) “Experimental Analysis of 
Neighborhood Effects” Econometrica 75(1) : 83–119. 
     Knight, John; Song Lina and Jia Huaibin (1999) “Chinese Rural Migrants in Enterprises: Three 
Perspectives” Journal of Development Studies 35: 73-104. 
     LaLonde, R. J., and R. H. Topel (1991) "Labor Market Adjustments to Increased Immigration," in J. 
M. Abowd and R. B. Freeman, eds., Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
     Lee, Everett S (1966) “A theory of migration” Demography 3: 47-57.   31 
     Lewis, W. Arthur (1954) “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour “ Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies 22:139-91. 
     Li, Hongbin; Junsen Zhang and Yi Zhu (2006) “The Effect of the One-Child Policy on Fertility in 
China: Identification Based on Differences-in-Differences” Working Paper, The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. 
     Liang, Qiusheng and Che-Fu Lee (2006) “Fertility and Population Policy: An Overview” in Fertility, 
Family Planning, and Population Policy in China, edited by D.L. Poston, Jr; Che-Fu Lee; Chiung-Fang 
Chang; Sherry L. McKibben and Carol S. Walther, published by Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 
     Lin, Justin Yifu; Gewei Wang and Yaohui Zhao “Regional Inequality and Regional Transfers in 
China” in Cai Fang and Bai Nansheng edited Labor Migration in Transition China 2006, Social Science 
Academy Press (China). 
     Lowry, I (1966) Migration and metropolitan growth: Two Analytical Models. San Francisco: Chandler.  
     Lucas, Robert E.B. (1987) “Emigration to South Africa’s mines” American Economic Review 77: 313-
330.  
     Lucas, Robert E.B. (1997) “Internal Migration in Developing Countries” Chapter 13, Handbook of 
Population and Family Economics, edited by M.R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark 1997, Elsevier.  
     Manski, Charles F (1993) “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem 
Review of Economic Studies, 60:531-542. 
     Mallee, Hein (2000) “Agricultural Labor and Rural Population Mobility: Some Observations,” In West, 
Loraine & Zhao, Yaohui edited Rural Labor Flows in China, Institute of East Asian Studies, University 
of California. 
     Maurin, Eric; Hulie Moschion (2009) “ The Social Multipiler and Labor Market Participation of 
Mother” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2009 1(1): 251-272. 
     Mckenzie, David and Hillel Rapoport (2007) “Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and 
Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico” Journal of Development Economics 84: 1-24.  
     Mckenzie, David and Nicole Hilderbrandt (2005) “The Effects of Migration on Child Health in 
Mexico” Economia 6(1): 257-289.  
     Meng, Xin (2000) “Regional wage gap, information flow, and rural--‐urban migration” In West, 
Loraine & Zhao, Yaohui edited Rural Labor Flows in China, Institute of East Asian Studies, University 
of California. 
     Men, Kepei and Wei Zeng (2003 “Prediction of China Population Over the Next 50 Years”, The 
Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics (in Chinese): F224. 
     Munshi, Kaivan (2003) “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor 
Market” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2): 549-600. 
     Qian, Nancy (2009) “Quantity-Quality and the One Child Policy: the Only-Child Disadvantage in 
School Enrollment in Rural China” NBER working paper #14973. 
     Rosenzweig, Mark R and Kenneth L Wolpin (1980) “Testing the Quantity-Quality Fertility Model: 
The Use of Twins as a Natural Experiment” Econometrica, January 1980a, 48(1) : 227-40. 
     Rosenzweig, Mark (1988) “Labor Markets in Low-income Countries” Chapter 15 in the Handbook of 
Deveopment Economics, Volume 1, edited by H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan, Elsevier.  
     Sen, Amartya (1990) “More than 100 million women are missing” New York Review of Books 37(20): 
61-66. 
     Sheng, Laiyun (2008) Flows or Migration: the Economic Analysis China’s Rural Labor Flow. 
Published by Shanghai Far East Publishers(China). 
     Sjaastad , Larry A (1962) “The costs and returns of human migration” The Journal of Political 
Economy, 1962, vol. 70, no. S5: 80-93. 
     Tan, Kejian (2003) “Value Difference of Sons and Daughters to Their Families in Poverty-stricken 
Areas”, Population Research (in Chinese): 2003 27(2). 
     Taylor, J. Edward (1986) “Differential migration, networks, information and risk” in Migration, 
Human Capital and Development, edited by O. Stark, published by JAI Press, Greenwich, CT.   32 
     Wan, Chuan; Dezhu Wang and Bo Li (2004) “Debates on Temporary Residence Permit System and 
Necessity for Adopting It” Chinese Journal of Population Science (in Chinese): C29. 
     Wang, Dewen; Wu Yaowu; and Cai Fang (2003) “Migration, unemployment, and urban labor market 
segregation in China’s economic transition” working paper, Beijing: Institute of Population and Labor 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
     White, Tyrene (1992 )“Birth Planning between Plan and Market: The Impact of Reform on China’s 
One-Child Policy”, China’s Economic Dilemmas in the 1990’s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, 
and Interdependence. Studies in Contemporary China. Armonk, N.Y.U.S.C.J.E. Committee and London, 
Sharpe, 1992: 252-69. 
     Woodruff, Christopher and Rene Zenteno (2007) “Migration Networks and Microenterprises in 
Mexico” Journal of Development Economics 82: 509-528.  
     Young, Alwyn (2003) “Gold into Base Metals: Productivity Growth in the People’s Republic of China 
during the Reform Period” Journal of Political Economy, Vol 111, no. 6. 
     Zhang, Weiqing (1998) Introduction to Family Planning in China (in Chinese), China Population 
Publishing House.  
     Zhao, Yaohui (1999a) “Leaving the Countryside: Rural-to-Urban Migration Decision in China” 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1999,  89(2): 281-286. 
     Zhao, Yaohui (1999b) “Labor Migration and Earnings Differences: the Case of Rural China” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 47(4): 767-782.  
     Zhao, Yaohui (2002) “Cause and Consequences of Return Migration: Recent Evidence from China” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 30, 376-394. 
     Zhao, Yaohui (2003) “The Role of Migrant Networks in Labor Migration: The Case of China” 
Contemporary Economic Policy 21: 500-511. 
     Zhao, Zhong (2005) “Migration, labor market flexibility, and wage determination 




Figure 1: Percent of adults that migrate in 2006, by age and gender, study sample 
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Figure 3: Histogram of unexplained migration rate per village, after village-level regression, study sample 
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Table 1: Distribution of migrants by destination, study sample 
Destination  % migrants   Per capita income of 2006  Railway hours to 
destination  (relative to rural of the sampled area) 
rural  urban 
Within province         
within the sampled area  10.20%  1.00  3.57  0 
outside the sampled area  16.05%  0.97  4.56  3-4 
Across province 
A  27.86%  3.59  8.40  26 
B  20.18%  2.49  7.57  20 
C  9.68%  2.37  6.71  38 
D  4.85%  1.10  5.07  10.5 
E  3.53%  2.85  6.83  36 
F  1.92%  4.47  10.98  26.5 
G  0.20%  1.41  5.57  6.5 
H  0.63%  1.47  4.51  13 
 
Table 2: Within-village cluster of migrants, by destination, industrial sector and surname 









% of migrants in the most common sector  75.10%  51.93%  46.21%  46.68% 
  (0.68%)  (1.00%)  (1.71%)   
% of migrants in the most common destination  63.80%  39.82%  31.66%  27.86% 
  (0.76%)  (0.84%)  (4.54%)   
% in the most common sector, conditional on   83.80%  59.07%  54.27%  59.05% 
      migrants in the most common destination  (0.59%)  (1.12%)  (5.90%)   
% in the most common sector of each   95.20%  58.33%  49.83%  47.63% 
     destination  (0.34%)  (0.81%)  (3.26%)   
% in the most common sector, conditional on   82.60%  52.80%  45.77%  43.97% 
     migrants with the most common surname  (0.60%)  (0.85%)  (3.26%)   
% in the most common destination, conditional  74.50%  41.31%  31.73%  26.80% 
     on migrants with most common surname  (0.69%)  (1.02 %)  (4.77%)   
% in the most common sector of each surname  90.10%  61.99%  48.95%  47.03% 
  (0.47%)  (0.76 %)  (1.52 %)   
% in the most common destination of each   85.80%  51.73%  34.90%  28.67% 
      surname  (0.56%)  (0.75 %)  (3.57 %)   
N of observations  3950  250  8  1 
Standard error in parentheses. The percentages are computed as follows: suppose 11 migrants of a village went to two 
destinations (A and B) for two sectors (X1 and X2). If 5 went to destination A with 3 in X1 and 2 in X2, and the other 6 
went to B with 1 in X1 and 5 in X2, the % in the most common sector is 7/11, the % in the most common destination is 
6/11 , the % in most common sector conditional on the most common destination is 5/6, and the % in the most common 
sector of  each destination is (3+5)/(5+6). Percentages by surname are computed similarly.   35 
Table 3: Summary of adults by the number and gender of child birth, study sample 
   # of 
observations 



















age 16  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Panel A: All adults aged 17-60 
All adults  3327996    0.17           0.58  0.68 
    (0.38)           (0.80)  (0.81) 
Adults with 
kids 
2081151    0.15           0.92  1.08 





1504799    0.14  0.69  0.76  0.58  1.00  1.17 
    (0.35)  (0.50)  (0.43)  (0.49)  (0.86)  (0.80) 
                
  Panel B: Conditional on the first-born child being single birth 
firstborn is 
boy  
758616  50.41%  0.14  0.68  0.64  0.64  0.55  1.52 
    (0.35)  (0.46)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.70)  (0.67) 
firstborn is 
girl 
734495  48.81%  0.14  0.71  0.87  0.52  1.48  0.80 
     (0.35)  (0.45)  (0.33)  (0.50)  (0.73)  (0.74) 
  Panel C: Conditional on the first-born children being multiple birth  
firstborns are 
all girls 
3123  0.21%  0.21  0.70  0.89  0.40  2.35  0.78 
    (0.41)  (0.46)  (0.31)  (0.49)  (0.64)  (0.70) 
firstborns are 
all boys 
3989  0.27%  0.20  0.39  0.55  0.63  0.28  2.24 




4576  0.31%  0.22  0.48  0.68  0.57  1.32  1.38 
     (0.42)  (0.50)  (0.46)  (0.49)  (0.59)  (0.56) 
Notes: Unit of analysis is adult labor aged 17-60 as defined in the study sample. Of the 576352 adults that have children 
but do not have clear-firstborn definition, 576101 (or 99.96%) is because they report at least one child over age 16 and 
therefore we are not sure that the reported oldest child is the real oldest child. The gender of second or later-borns is 
conditional on the families that have second birth.    36 
Table 4 Test for the validity of instruments 
  Dependent Variable 
  migrate or not  # of kids  Family size  Having at 
least one boy 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
having a girl firstborn  0.00392***  0.00331***  0.0132***  0.248***  0.256***  -0.318*** 
  (0.000824)  (0.000823)  (0.000994)  (0.00388)  (0.00399)  (0.00164) 
female* girl firstborn      -0.0201***       
      (0.000940)       
1 if firstborn info missing  0.0437***  0.0371***  0.0373***  -1.444***  -0.771***  -0.680*** 
  (0.00142)  (0.00136)  (0.00136)  (0.00450)  (0.00729)  (0.00153) 
female    -0.0325***  -0.0281***  -0.133***  -0.785***  -0.0367*** 
    (0.000947)  (0.000929)  (0.00596)  (0.0100)  (0.00197) 
age    -0.0212***  -0.0213***  0.247***  0.390***  0.0832*** 
    (0.000349)  (0.000349)  (0.00174)  (0.00233)  (0.000485) 
age square    0.000159***  0.000160***  -0.00310***  -0.00430***  -0.00106*** 
    (3.53e-06)  (3.53e-06)  (2.06e-05)  (2.81e-05)  (5.67e-06) 
distance to nearest station    0.00879***  0.00877***  -0.00256***  0.0338***  0.00191*** 
    (0.000273)  (0.000273)  (0.000693)  (0.00107)  (0.000180) 
years of schooling    9.70e-05  9.81e-05  0.000858*  0.00145**  0.000160** 
    (0.000225)  (0.000225)  (0.000442)  (0.000619)  (7.74e-05) 
County dummy  control  control  control  control  control  control 
Numbers of Observations  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  1,153,804  1,153,804  1,153,804 
Level of Observations  individual  individual  individual  household  household  household 
R square  0.0879  0.2016  0.2017  0.5298  0.1986  0.4667 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. The error terms are clustered 
by village. 
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Table 5: Key coefficients of OLS and 2SLS regressions on Specification 1, study sample 
Panel A: First stage 
  Dependent Variables: peer migration ( , iv y ) 
  (1) OLS  (2) 2SLS  (3) 2SLS  (4) 2SLS 
% of same-village adults having multiples in the 
first birth    0.545**    0.487** 
    (0.154)    (0.154) 
% of same-village male labors residing in 
households with a girl firstborn      0.715***  0.683*** 
      (0.129)  (0.129) 
% of same-village females residing in households 
with a girl firstborn      -0.691***  -0.662*** 
      (0.122)  (0.122) 
Number of observations    3327996  3327996  3327996 
R square    0.340  0.343  0.345 
First stage F-statistics    12.47  16.33  13.86 
Panel B: Second Stage 
    Dependent Variable: self migration ( , iv y ) 
% of same-village adults migrating  0.930***  0.631***  0.768***  0.727*** 
  (0.00326)  (0.106)  (0.0407)  (0.0438) 
Conditional LR test for weak IV    [0.571, 0.672]                     [0.721,0.787]  [0.685,0.743] 
 
(other coefficients are reported in Appendix Table A2) 
         
Observations  3327996  3327996  3327996  3327996 
R-squared  0.276  0.267  0.273  0.272 
Panel C: Reduced form 
  Dependent Variable: self migration ( , iv y ) 
% of same-village adults having multiples in the 
first birth    0.346**    0.300** 
    (0.152)    (0.152) 
% of same-village male labors residing in 
households with a girl firstborn      0.600***  0.582*** 
      (0.125)  (0.125) 
% of same-village females residing in households 
with a girl firstborn      -0.518***  -0.502*** 
      (0.118)  (0.118) 
Number of observations    3327996  3327996  3327996 
R square    0.196  0.196  0.197 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for county fixed effects, 
registered township population, presence of highway exit, and # of township-village-enterprises in township. Errors are 
clustered by village.   38 
Table 6: Robust checks on Specification 1 
 


































































household   
 
   
Specification  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
   （1）  （2）  (3)  (4)  (5)  （6）  （7）  (8)  (9)  （10）  （11） 
% of same-village adults 
that migrate (exclude 
own household)  0.727***  0.674***  0.789***  0.741***  0.681***  0.622***  0.810***  0.782***  0.482***  0.604***  0.710*** 
  (0.0438)  (0.116)  (0.0757)  (0.0407)  (0.148)  (0.0825)  (0.0458)  (0.104)  (0.0396)  (0.0186)  (0.0217) 
% of same-township 
adults that migrate 
(exclude own village) 
           




     
                  (0.103)       
% of same-household 
adults that migrate 
(exclude self) 
           
        0.144*** 
   
                      (0.002)     
Control Other Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Numbers of Observations 3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  2,138,948  2,330,227 
R-squared  0.272  0.268  0.275  0.260  0.270  0.267  0.259  0.274  0.333  0.226  0.273 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for county fixed effects (except for column 3) and 
all the other variables used in Table 6. Errors are clustered by village.   39 
 
Table 7 2SLS regression by destination, study sample 
    Dependent Variable: Migration to 
  
Within 
province  A  B  C  D 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
% of same village adults migrating to 
same province  0.996***  -0.00512  -0.00255  -0.00197  0.00125 
  (0.0170)  (0.0283)  (0.0279)  (0.00826)  (0.00419) 
% of same village adults migrating to A  0.0501**  1.103***  0.109***  0.0341***  0.00942* 
  (0.0207)  (0.0364)  (0.0369)  (0.0107)  (0.00506) 
% of same village adults migrating to B  -0.0597  0.0130  1.009***  0.000879  -0.0240** 
  (0.0384)  (0.0632)  (0.0626)  (0.0185)  (0.00992) 
% of same village adults migrating to C  -0.0327  -0.138  -0.132  0.964***  0.000261 
  (0.0548)  (0.0981)  (0.0984)  (0.0282)  (0.0135) 
% of same village adults migrating to D  -0.0928  -0.153*  -0.125  -0.0648**  0.967*** 
  (0.0568)  (0.0848)  (0.0790)  (0.0274)  (0.0160) 
Observations  3327996  3327996  3327996  3327996  3327996 
R-squared  0.102  0.106  0.097  0.068  0.043 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 
county fixed effects, all the control variables used in Table 6, and percent of same village adults migrating to other 
destinations. Errors are clustered by village. Shaded cells refer to influence from peers migrating to the same 
destination. 
 
Table 8 2SLS regression by industrial sector, study sample 
  Dependent Variable: Migration for 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  manufacturing  service  construction  other jobs 
                   
% of same-village adults migrating 
for manufacturing jobs  0.927***  -0.00439  -0.0120  -0.0258 
  (0.0743)  (0.0164)  (0.0133)  (0.0373) 
% of same-village adults migrating 
for service jobs  -0.454*  0.896***  -0.0405  -0.205* 
  (0.243)  (0.0540)  (0.0430)  (0.122) 
% of same-village adults migrating 
for construction jobs  0.0414  0.0115  0.937***  -0.0197 
  (0.163)  (0.0361)  (0.0304)  (0.0822) 
% of same-village adults migrating 
for other jobs  -0.236***  -0.0531***  -0.0276*  0.879*** 
  (0.0759)  (0.0167)  (0.0142)  (0.0386) 
Observations  3327996  3327996  3327996  3327996 
R-squared  0.190  0.065  0.071  0.132 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 
county fixed effects, and all the control variables used in Table 6. Errors are clustered by village. Shaded cells refer 
to influence from peers migrating for the same industrial sector. 
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Table 10: Heterogeneous effects of peer migration, study sample 
  Dependent Variable: Self migration, 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 











  (0.0346)  (0.039)  (0.0397)  (0.101)  (0.0397) 
% of same-village adults that migrate * 




   
 
 
  (0.00776)         
% of same-village adults that migrate * 
distance to county center     
0.00016 
     
    (0.00014)       
% of same-village adults that migrate * 
distance to the center of the studied area       
0.00054*     
      (0.000282)     
% of same-village adults that migrate * 
distance to the provincial capital        0.00131**   
        (0.000357)   
% of same-village adults that migrate * have 
TV access           
0.0182 
          (0.0274) 
Numbers of Observations (household)  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996  3,327,996 
R-squared  0.274  0.274  0.275  0.274  0.274 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 
county fixed effects and all the control variables used in Table 6. IVs are the same as in Column (4) of Table 6. 
Errors are clustered by village.   41 
Appendix A:  China’s migration pattern and hukou restrictions 
 
The land-population pressure is more acute in China than in other countries. According to the 
World Bank, China’s rural population per square kilometer of arable land was 592 in 2000. Although this 
number has declined to 542 in 2005 (probably due to migration and fertility control), it is still higher than 
that of US (33), Mexico (98), and India (489). The high population density implies that rural China 
potentially have a large amount of agricultural labor that could be more productive in other activities.  
The transfer from agricultural labor to non-agricultural activities takes two forms in China. One is 
working for local Township-Village-Enterprises. These enterprises often locate in the same village or 
same town, allowing workers to commute between home and work every day. The other form is migrating 
to a far-away city, working there, and coming home occasionally for holidays, family visits, or agricultural 
seasons. As shown in Appendix Figure A1, the percent of rural population engaging in local non-
agriculture work has increased from roughly 16% in 1985 to over 25% in 2005. In comparison, the percent 
of people migrating for city work grows much faster, from 2.2% in 1985 to nearly 20% in 2005.  
A large fraction of the rural-to-urban migration moves across province. Based on the 2000 China 
Population Census, rural-to-urban migration accounts for 52% of intra-province moves but 78% of inter-
province moves (Cai and Wang 2003). Within inter-province migration, 75% of migrants move from the 
West and Mid-west to the East (Wang, Wu and Cai 2003).
34 Rural migrants are concentrated in 
manufacturing (32%), construction (22%), services (12%) and retail (5%) (Sheng 2008).   
Most rural migrants cannot obtain a permanent residential permit in their working cities. Before 
1984, most individual activities, including employment, schooling and social benefits, were closely tied to 
an individual’s residence permit (Hukou). The enforcement of the Hukou system was relaxed over time, 
partly because more and more enterprises are not province-owned and do not require local Hukou for 
employment, partly because Chinese government has adopted a series of policies that allow people to live 
in cities without local Hukou (Chen 2006). For example, if a rural-to-urban migrant wants to work in a city 
for more than one month, the city will issue a temporary residential permit (TRP) condition on the 
migrant’s employment status. Alternatively, the migrant can apply for a TRP by staying in the house of a 
local resident (or a hotel) but that resident (or hotel owner) must show a valid residential permit of the city 
to the local police. If a migrant is caught without Hukou and TRP, s/he is subject to fine and could be sent 
back home. Like Hukou, TRP constitutes a barrier to entry into urban areas and is quite controversial. 
Some cities tried to eliminate TRP, but many of them end up reactivating it because local residents prefer 
to have it due to safety reasons.
35 By the time of our sample period (2006), most destinations observed in 
our sample still issue and enforce TRP.  
                                                 
34 Lin, Wang and Zhao (2006) show that, in the year of 2000, the urban per capita income is 142% higher than that of 
rural areas. Per capita income of 12 coastal provinces on the East is 65% higher than that of inland areas. 
35 As documented in Wan, Wang and Li (2004), temporary residential permit has reduced urban crime because (1) it 
facilitates the management of rural-to-urban migrants, (2) it helps the police to target crimes committed by or towards 
migrants, and (3) the police can educate migrants in laws and law enforcement.     42 
In short, although the relaxed Hukou system and the introduction of TRP have fostered rural-to-
urban migration, they do not facilitate once-for-all migration to the city. Without urban Hukou, rural 
migrants have to keep their families at home, work alone in the city, and tolerate discrimination in 
schooling, housing, health insurance, work protection, and retirement benefits. Knight, Song and Jia 
(1999) document that migrants on average spend 6.8 months away from home in 1993. Using newer data, 
Du (2000) finds that the away time is on average 8 months per year for migrants from Sichuan (a western 
province) and 7 months for migrants from Anhui (a middle province). 
Despite the inconvenience of long-distance travel, most migrants work away from home for years 
and do not return permanently to their rural origin. Using data from six provinces, Zhao (2002) estimates 
that 8.3% of those that migrated in 1998 returned to the origin area and remained there from the end of 
1998 to August 1999. Based on more recent data, Sheng (2008) finds that among all the rural people who 
migrated in 2003, only 7.1% returned home and did not migrate again during 2004. The return percentage 
is the lowest for those in the 16-25 age group (6.2%) and the highest for age 45 and above (16.7%).   
 
Appendix B: China’s one child policy 
China started the one-child policy in late 1970s. Due to strong boy preference, the policy is 
difficult to implement in rural areas, especially if the firstborn is a girl. The aggressive implementation of 
the one-child policy in early 1980s and the subsequent conflicts in rural areas motivated the central 
government to relax the one-child policy in 1984. The most important change in the 1984 policy is 
allowing a rural family to have a second child if the firstborn is female. With an intention to reduce 
infanticide of firstborn girls, the percentage of rural households receiving a second child permit has 
increased from 5% in 1982 to 50% in 1986 (White 1992). 
The province of our data stipulates that a household with both parents having rural hukous is 
eligible to apply for the permit of a second child if (1) the first born is a girl, or (2) at least one of the 
parents belongs to a minority ethnicity, or (3) the mother of the child is a single child herself and the father 
of the child lives with the parents of the child’s mother.  However, the government won’t issue the permit 
if the mother was less than 30 year old at the time of the first birth and the birth space between the two 
births is less than four years. If a rural household has a second birth without the permit, the household is 
subject to fines.    43 
Appendix Figure A1: Transfer of rural labor to non-agriculture activities, 1985-2004, all China  
 
 




Appendix Figure A2: Distribution of migrants by # of months away from home in 2006, study 
sample  
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Appendix Table A1: Summary statistics by migration status, study sample 
   All Adults age 17-60  Non-Migrants  Migrants 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  mean  std dev  mean  std dev  mean  std dev 
Panel A: Individual Attributes 
age  35.63  (11.66)  37.34  (11.61)  27.36  (7.70) 
years of schooling  6.44  (2.87)  6.15  (2.93)  7.84  (2.04) 
female  0.47  (0.50)  0.48  (0.50)  0.38  (0.48) 
being household head  0.35  (0.48)  0.38  (0.49)  0.17  (0.38) 
whether my first single birth is girl
1  0.49  (0.50)  0.49  (0.50)  0.49  (0.50) 
whether my first birth is multiples
2  0.01  (0.09)  0.01  (0.08)  0.01  (0.11) 
minimum age of my own children under age 16
3  7.58  (4.74)  7.61  (4.71)  7.39  (4.90) 
maximal age of my own children under age 16
3  10.29  (4.74)  10.40  (4.69)  9.65  (4.94) 
Panel B: Household attributes 
household head age  45.39  (11.16)  44.70  (10.95)  48.73  (11.56) 
household head being female  0.05  (0.22)  0.05  (0.22)  0.07  (0.26) 
household head yr of schooling  6.26  (2.83)  6.27  (2.82)  6.24  (2.88) 
# of HH members age 0-6  0.40  (0.71)  0.41  (0.71)  0.38  (0.69) 
# of HH members age 7-16  0.87  (1.11)  0.91  (1.12)  0.66  (1.00) 
# of HH members age 17-23  0.83  (1.02)  0.78  (0.99)  1.08  (1.11) 
# of HH members age 24-44  1.59  (0.90)  1.56  (0.88)  1.72  (0.99) 
# of HH members age 45-59  0.75  (0.88)  0.73  (0.88)  0.85  (0.89) 
# of HH members age 60+  0.23  (0.54)  0.21  (0.51)  0.35  (0.65) 
# of girls in the HH age 0-16  0.58  (0.81)  0.61  (0.82)  0.48  (0.76) 
# of boys in the HH age 0-16  0.68  (0.81)  0.71  (0.82)  0.55  (0.77) 
Has any boy in the HH? (age 0-16)  0.49  (0.50)  0.51  (0.50)  0.41  (0.49) 
estimated house value (10,000 yuan)  2.36  (2.80)  2.37  (2.87)  2.28  (2.43) 
have any outstanding loans  0.14  (0.34)  0.13  (0.34)  0.15  (0.36) 
contract land (mu)
5  3.45  (2.54)  3.44  (2.55)  3.48  (2.45) 
land in use (mu)
5  4.13  (3.04)  4.15  (3.04)  3.99  (3.06) 
Prevalence of HH head's surname in the village  0.10  (0.12)  0.10  (0.12)  0.10  (0.11) 
HH head's surname is the largest surname in the village  0.21  (0.41)  0.21  (0.41)  0.21  (0.41) 
HH head's surname is the second largest in the village  0.13  (0.34)  0.13  (0.34)  0.13  (0.33) 
HH head's surname is the third largest in the village  0.10  (0.29)  0.10  (0.29)  0.10  (0.29) 
HH head's surname is below the third largest in the village  0.56  (0.50)  0.56  (0.50)  0.57  (0.50) 
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Appendix Table A1 (continued) 
   All Adults age 17-60  Non-Migrants  Migrants 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  mean  std dev  mean  std dev  mean  std dev 
Panel C: Village attributes 
distance to the nearest bus station (kilometer)  6.02  (8.23)  6.16  (8.37)  5.35  (7.45) 
whether the village is a minority gathering  0.30  (0.46)  0.31  (0.46)  0.26  (0.44) 
the village has a national poverty status  0.51  (0.50)  0.51  (0.50)  0.49  (0.50) 
# of adults 17-60 in the village  1083.00  (545.67)  1083.73  (543.30)  1079.43  (556.97) 
average land per adult (mu)
4  1.63  (0.70)  1.64  (0.71)  1.59  (0.64) 
whether regular water use is guaranteed  0.37  (0.48)  0.36  (0.48)  0.43  (0.49) 
have organized production and sale of agriculture products  0.09  (0.28)  0.08  (0.28)  0.10  (0.29) 
% of natural gathering groups that have access to electricity  0.96  (0.16)  0.96  (0.16)  0.97  (0.13) 
% of natural gathering groups that have access to telephone  0.78  (0.34)  0.77  (0.35)  0.83  (0.30) 
% of natural gathering groups that have access to TV signal  0.91  (0.26)  0.90  (0.27)  0.92  (0.24) 
% of natural gathering groups that have access to drivable 
road  0.66  (0.31)  0.66  (0.32)  0.68  (0.30) 
Panel D: attributes of adults in the same village 
% of adults in the village that are migrants (exclude all 
adults in self HH)  0.17  (0.14)  0.15  (0.13)  0.29  (0.12) 
% of first-born children being girl (exclude self, single birth 
only)  0.49  (0.06)  0.49  (0.06)  0.49  (0.05) 
% of first-born children being multiples (exclude self)  0.01  (0.01)  0.01  (0.01)  0.01  (0.01) 
Observations  3327996  2759453  568543 
Notes: An individual is defined as migrant if s/he has been away from the village for the reason of work for more than 15 days in 
2006. Because we code first birth missing if a household reports no child or the oldest child above age 16 (see more details in 
Section 2), we have (1) "whether own first child is girl" has 1834855 missing observations (55.1%), (2) "whether own first birth is 
multiples" has 1823197 missing observations (54.78%), (3) minimum and maximum child age has 1257900 missing observations 
each (37.8%). (4) One Chinese mu is equal to 666.7 square meters or 0.1647 acres.    
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Appendix Table A2: Full results of the 2SLS regression on Specification 1, study sample 
    Dependent Variable: self migration ( , iv y ) 
% of same-village adults migrating  0.930***  0.631***  0.768***  0.727*** 
  (0.00326)  (0.106)  (0.0407)  (0.0438) 
Conditional LR test for weak IV    [0.571, 0.672]                     [0.721,0.787]  [0.685,0.743] 
female  -0.0485***  -0.0484***  -0.0484***  -0.0484*** 
  (0.00117)  (0.00119)  (0.00118)  (0.00118) 
age  -0.0116***  -0.0117***  -0.0117***  -0.0117*** 
  (0.000269)  (0.000278)  (0.000272)  (0.000272) 
age square  2.74e-05***  3.02e-05***  2.89e-05***  2.93e-05*** 
  (2.94e-06)  (3.10e-06)  (2.97e-06)  (2.97e-06) 
years of schooling  0.00852***  0.00871***  0.00862***  0.00865*** 
  (0.000233)  (0.000242)  (0.000232)  (0.000232) 
# of HH members aged 0-6  0.00642***  0.00764***  0.00708***  0.00725*** 
  (0.000944)  (0.00103)  (0.000957)  (0.000957) 
# of HH members aged 7-16  0.00743***  0.00857***  0.00805***  0.00821*** 
  (0.000610)  (0.000697)  (0.000618)  (0.000614) 
# of HH members aged 17-23  0.00374***  0.00565***  0.00478***  0.00504*** 
  (0.000397)  (0.000756)  (0.000466)  (0.000469) 
# of HH members aged 24-44  0.0256***  0.0282***  0.0270***  0.0274*** 
  (0.000610)  (0.00101)  (0.000705)  (0.000688) 
# of HH members aged 45-59  0.0325***  0.0347***  0.0337***  0.0340*** 
  (0.000670)  (0.000997)  (0.000739)  (0.000737) 
# of HH members aged 60+  0.0170***  0.0206***  0.0189***  0.0194*** 
  (0.000716)  (0.00141)  (0.000878)  (0.000880) 
having at least one boy in HH  -0.00598***  -0.00575***  -0.00585***  -0.00582*** 
  (0.000868)  (0.000896)  (0.000877)  (0.000881) 
minimum age of own child  0.00309***  0.00310***  0.00309***  0.00310*** 
  (0.000128)  (0.000131)  (0.000129)  (0.000129) 
having a girl firstborn  0.00218***  0.00191***  0.00203***  0.00200*** 
  (0.000710)  (0.000726)  (0.000716)  (0.000717) 
first birth is multiples  0.00510  0.0124***  -0.0316***  -0.0305*** 
  ()  (0.00467)  (0.00475)  (0.00457) 
second birth is multiples  -0.0128***  -0.0110***  -0.0118***  -0.0116*** 
  (0.00351)  (0.00363)  (0.00355)  (0.00357) 
Is household head  -0.0353***  -0.0353***  -0.0353***  -0.0353*** 
  (0.00121)  (0.00121)  (0.00121)  (0.00121) 
age of household head  0.00341***  0.00360***  0.00351***  0.00354*** 
  (6.85e-05)  (9.31e-05)  (7.38e-05)  (7.34e-05) 
household head is female  0.0226***  0.0244***  0.0236***  0.0238*** 
  (0.00145)  (0.00166)  (0.00151)  (0.00152) 
years of schooling for household head  -0.00253***  -0.00191***  -0.00220***  -0.00211*** 
  (0.000189)  (0.000304)  (0.000217)  (0.000222) 
estimated house value  -0.00281***  -0.00355***  -0.00321***  -0.00331*** 
  (0.000159)  (0.000329)  (0.000196)  (0.000207) 
contract land (mu)  -0.00150***  -0.00262***  -0.00211***  -0.00226***   48 
  (0.000182)  (0.000436)  (0.000244)  (0.000251) 
Prevalence of HH head's surname in village  -0.00102  0.00148  0.000340  0.000681 
  (0.00290)  (0.00440)  (0.00343)  (0.00366) 
distance to nearest bus station  -7.96e-05**  -1.95e-05  -4.70e-05  -3.88e-05 
  (3.18e-05)  (8.12e-05)  (5.19e-05)  (5.95e-05) 
village is a minority gathering  0.00122*  -0.00414  -0.00169  -0.00242* 
  (0.000639)  (0.00255)  (0.00127)  (0.00145) 
village has national poverty status  -0.00157**  -0.00200  -0.00180*  -0.00186 
  (0.000633)  (0.00157)  (0.00103)  (0.00118) 
# of adults in the village  -0.00722***  -0.0124***  -0.0100***  -0.0107*** 
  (0.00104)  (0.00310)  (0.00186)  (0.00209) 
arable land in the village (mu)   0.00322***  0.00677***  0.00515***  0.00564*** 
  (0.000794)  (0.00218)  (0.00133)  (0.00149) 
regular water use is guaranteed  -0.00131**  -0.00356**  -0.00253**  -0.00284** 
  (0.000607)  (0.00179)  (0.00104)  (0.00120) 
village has organized production and sale of  0.00241**  0.00308  0.00278*  0.00287 
    agricultural products  (0.000985)  (0.00250)  (0.00165)  (0.00189) 
% of natural gathering groups within the village  -0.00311*  0.00314  0.000281  0.00113 
    having access to electricity  (0.00176)  (0.00458)  (0.00287)  (0.00323) 
% of natural gathering groups within the village   0.000538  0.0122***  0.00685***  0.00843*** 
    having access to telephone  (0.000908)  (0.00455)  (0.00208)  (0.00228) 
% of natural gathering groups within the village   0.00247*  -0.00206  1.03e-05  -0.000608 
    having access to TV signals  (0.00130)  (0.00324)  (0.00196)  (0.00222) 
% of natural gathering groups within the village   0.00373***  0.00383*  0.00378**  0.00380** 
    having access to drivable roads  (0.000932)  (0.00225)  (0.00148)  (0.00170) 
Observations  3327996  3327996  3327996  3327996 
R-squared  0.276  0.267  0.273  0.272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for county fixed effects, 
registered township population, presence of highway exit, and # of township-village-enterprises in township. Errors are 
clustered by village.   49 
Appendix Table A3: 2SLS regression by age cohort 
  Dependent Variable: Migration 
sample    17-20  21-25  26-30  31-35    36-40  41-45   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
% of same-village adults aged 17-20 
that migrate  1.142***  0.697***  0.577***  0.287**  0.0989*  0.0366 
  (0.0563)  (0.145)  (0.175)  (0.117)  (0.0532)  (0.0271) 
% of same-village adults aged 21-25 
that migrate  -0.224***  0.339**  -0.0586  0.0810  0.0422  0.0288 
  (0.0513)  (0.143)  (0.170)  (0.113)  (0.0503)  (0.0258) 
% of same-village adults aged 26-30  
that migrate  -0.0572  -0.320**  -0.0311  -0.497***  -0.222***  -0.122*** 
  (0.0573)  (0.163)  (0.206)  (0.144)  (0.0626)  (0.0328) 
% of same-village adults aged 31-35 
that migrate  0.108  0.153  -0.245  0.423**  -0.141  0.0133 
  (0.0832)  (0.229)  (0.274)  (0.207)  (0.0938)  (0.0442) 
% of same-village adults aged 36-40 
that migrate  0.238  0.417  0.993**  0.753**  1.305***  0.170** 
  (0.148)  (0.389)  (0.481)  (0.339)  (0.150)  (0.0723) 
% of same-village adults aged 41-45 
that migrate  -0.213  -0.339  0.0118  0.168  -0.112  0.742*** 
  (0.187)  (0.496)  (0.556)  (0.382)  (0.179)  (0.0947) 
Observations  341307  442035  472301  498009  506443  339076 
R-squared  0.275  0.299  0.290  0.226  0.149  0.096 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 
county fixed effects, all the control variables used in Table 6, and the percentages of same village adults aged 46-50, 
51-55, 56-60 that migrate. Errors are clustered by village. Shaded cells refer to influence from peers of the same age 
group.  
 
Appendix Table A4: 2SLS regression by gender 
  Dependent variable: migration 
Sample  male  female 
  (1)  (2) 
% of same-village male adults that migrate  0.766***  0.237*** 
  (13.34)  (3.52) 
% of same-village female adults that migrate  0.097  0.437*** 
  （1.91）  (7.36) 
Numbers of Observations  1,780,353  1,547,643 
R-Squared  0.29  0.27 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 
county fixed effects and all the control variables used in Table 6. Errors are clustered by village. Shaded cells refer to 
influence from peers of the same gender. 
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Appendix Table A5: 2SLS regression by surname groups 
    Dependent Variable: migration 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




surname   











% of migrants among adults that 
have the most dominant surname in 
the village  0.976***  0.0948  0.154  0.231* 
  (0.150)  (0.213)  (0.230)  (0.122) 
% of migrants among adults that 
have the second most dominant 
surname in the village  0.259**  1.239***  0.378*  0.300** 
  (0.101)  (0.172)  (0.213)  (0.145) 
% of migrants among adults that 
have the third most dominant 
surname in the village  -0.118  -0.321*  0.435*  -0.00815 
  (0.111)  (0.179)  (0.225)  (0.147) 
% of migrants among adults that 
have other surnames in the village  -0.258  -0.231  -0.208  0.302* 
  (0.210)  (0.310)  (0.301)  (0.175) 
Observations  754602  457514  337638  1973942 
R-squared  0.279  0.263  0.274  0.268 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions 
include county fixed effects and all the control variables used in Table 6. Errors are clustered by village. Shaded 
cells refer to influence from peers of the same surname group.  
 
Appendix Table A6: 2SLS regression by education group 
  Dependent Variable: migration 
Sample  Edu: 0-5  Edu: 6-9  Edu: 10-12  Edu>12 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
% of migrants among adults whose years of 









  (7.90)   (2.66)   (3.22)   (1.03) 
% of migrants among adults whose years of 








  (-1.51)  (-1.85)  (-0.41)  (-0.35) 
% of migrants among adults whose years of 
schooling is between 10  and 13 
0.112**  0.339***  0.753***  0.361 
  (2.55)   (2.97)   (7.12)   (1.1) 
% of migrants among adults whose years of 









  (-0.59)  (0.14）  （-0.83）  (3.39)  
Observations  1358,858  834404  49331  5579 
R-squared  0.2  0.26  0.23  0.26 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions 
include county fixed effects and all the control variables used in Table 6. Errors are clustered by village. 
Shaded cells refer to influence from peers of the same education group.   51 
Appendix Table A7: Impact of peer migration on the land in use by non-migrating households 
  Dependent Variable: land 
Sample  Exclude migration family 
  OLS  2SLS 
  (1)  (2) 
% of same-village adults that migrate  1.393***  -0.131 
  (0.089)  (0.794) 
Numbers of Observations (household)  984,110  984,110 
R-squared  0.737  0.733 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 






Appendix Table A8: Empirical tests for organized migration or organized recruiting 
   Dependent Variable: Migration , all 2SLS 
  Include village cadre demographics 
Redefine IVs based on children age 
0-12 only 
  (1) 2SLS  (2) 2SLS 
% of same-village adults migrating   0.735***  0.672*** 
  (0.0417)  (0.0477) 
Numbers of Observations  3,327,996  3,327,996 
R-Squared  0.272  0.269 
Notes: Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include 
county fixed effects, all the control variables used in Table 6, and village cadre demographics (gender, education and 
veteran status for village head and communist party leader.). Errors are clustered by village. 
 
 